AdapAction: Adaptive Target Action Backdoor Attack against GUI Agents
Baicheng Chen, Mingda Zhang, Min Zhang, Haizhou Li, Baoyuan Wu
Abstract
Autonomous Graphical User Interface (GUI) agents powered by Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are increasingly vital for complex task automation. However, their capacity for self-driven decision-making introduces significant, yet underexplored, security risks, among which backdoor attacks pose a particularly stealthy and highimpact threat. Prior work has shown GUI agents vulnerable to such attacks, but existing methods rely on static trigger-action mappings that execute fixed, context-agnostic behaviors, making them highly detectable. To address this limitation, we introduce AdapAction, a novel backdoor attack that subverts the agent's decision-making by embedding an adaptive, context-aware policy. Unlike traditional approaches, AdapAction enables the agent to autonomously select environmentally coherent malicious actions based on the current GUI state and user instruction, thereby evading detection while preserving functional utility. Extensive experiments on the Android-In-The-Zoo (AitZ) and Android-Control benchmarks show that AdapAction achieves up to 100% Attack Success Rate (ASR) while preserving benign task utility. More critically, AdapAction consistently evades a multi-principle-based LLM defense evaluating instruction alignment, visual coherence, and safety, whereas traditional fixed-action attacks are easily detected. This resilience stems from AdapAction's contextually grounded malicious actions, which are semantically and visually indistinguishable from legitimate operations. As a result, AdapAction exhibits exceptional stealth and poses a significantly greater real-world threat to LLM-powered GUI agents.
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