AEX-NStep: Probabilistic Interrupt Counting Attacks on Intel SGX
Nicolas Dutly, Friederike Groschupp, Ivan Puddu, Kari Kostiainen, Srdjan Capkun
Abstract
To mitigate interrupt-based stepping attacks (notably using SGX-Step), Intel introduced AEX-Notify, an ISA extension to Intel SGX that aims to prevent deterministic single-stepping. In this work, we introduce AEX-NStep, the first interrupt counting attack on AEX-Notify-enabled Enclaves. We show that deterministic single-stepping is not required for interrupt counting attacks to be practical and that, therefore, AEX-Notify does not entirely prevent such attacks. We specifically show that one of AEX-Notify's security guarantees, obfuscated forward progress, does not hold, and we introduce two new probabilistic interrupt counting attacks. We use these attacks to construct a practical ECDSA key leakage attack on an AEX-Notify-enabled SGX enclave. Our results extend the original security analysis of AEX-Notify and inform the design of future mitigations.
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- A Tale of Two Worlds: Assessing the Vulnerability of Enclave Shielding Runtimes cites Telling Your Secrets without Page Faults: Stealthy Page Table-Based Attacks on Enclaved Execution
- M-Step: A Single-Stepping Framework for Side-Channel Analysis on TrustZone-M cites A Tale of Two Worlds: Assessing the Vulnerability of Enclave Shielding Runtimes
- M-Step: A Single-Stepping Framework for Side-Channel Analysis on TrustZone-M cites T-SGX: Eradicating Controlled-Channel Attacks Against Enclave Programs
- M-Step: A Single-Stepping Framework for Side-Channel Analysis on TrustZone-M cites Telling Your Secrets without Page Faults: Stealthy Page Table-Based Attacks on Enclaved Execution
- ZombieLoad: Cross-Privilege-Boundary Data Sampling cites Telling Your Secrets without Page Faults: Stealthy Page Table-Based Attacks on Enclaved Execution
Cited by top-tier papers1
Builds on13
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- T-SGX: Eradicating Controlled-Channel Attacks Against Enclave ProgramsMing-Wei Shih, Sangho Lee, Taesoo Kim, Marcus PeinadoNDSS 2017 · 431 citations
- Telling Your Secrets without Page Faults: Stealthy Page Table-Based Attacks on Enclaved ExecutionJo Van Bulck, Nico Weichbrodt, Rüdiger Kapitza, Frank Piessens et al.USENIX Security 2017 · 316 citations
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- A Tale of Two Worlds: Assessing the Vulnerability of Enclave Shielding RuntimesJo Van Bulck, David F. Oswald, Eduard Marin, Abdulla Aldoseri et al.CCS 2019 · 159 citations
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