Extracting Randomness from Extractor-Dependent Sources
Yevgeniy Dodis, Vinod Vaikuntanathan, Daniel Wichs
Abstract
We revisit the well-studied problem of extracting nearly uniform randomness from an arbitrary source of sufficient min-entropy. Strong seeded extractors solve this problem by relying on a public random seed, which is unknown to the source. Here, we consider a setting where the seed is reused over time and the source may depend on prior calls to the extractor with the same seed. Can we still extract nearly uniform randomness?
In more detail, we assume the seed is chosen randomly, but the source can make arbitrary oracle queries to the extractor with the given seed before outputting a sample. We require that the sample has entropy and differs from any of the previously queried values. The extracted output should look uniform even to a distinguisher that gets the seed. We consider two variants of the problem, depending on whether the source only outputs the sample, or whether it can also output some correlated public auxiliary information that preserves the sample's entropy. Our results are:
We show that every pseudo-random function (PRF) with a sufficiently high security level is a good extractor in this setting, even if the distinguisher is computationally unbounded. We further show that the source necessarily needs to be computationally bounded and that such extractors imply one-way functions.
We construct secure extractors in this setting, as long as both the source and the distinguisher are computationally bounded. We give several constructions based on different intermediate primitives, yielding instantiations based on the DDH, DLIN, LWE or DCR assumptions. On the negative side, we show that one cannot prove security against computationally unbounded distinguishers in this setting under any standard assumption via a black-box reduction. Furthermore, even when restricting to computationally bounded distinguishers, we show that there exist PRFs that are insecure as extractors in this setting and that a large class of constructions cannot be proven secure via a black-box reduction from standard assumptions.
Ask about this paper
Your agent reads all of it.
Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.
Your agent calls
Luneget_paper_fulltext
Free to start. No credit card required.
Terminal
Install the CLIlune papers fulltext efb23f1b-b6af-476b-8473-fe3c4d787ff6Cited by top-tier papers2
- Targeted Lossy Functions and ApplicationsWilly Quach, Brent Waters, Daniel WichsCRYPTO 2021 · 9 citations
- Lossy Cryptography from Code-Based AssumptionsQuang Dao, Aayush JainCRYPTO 2024 · 8 citations
Related papers
- How to Extract Useful Randomness from Unreliable SourcesDivesh Aggarwal, Maciej Obremski, João Ribeiro, Luisa Siniscalchi et al.EUROCRYPT 2020 · 11 citations
- Extractors for Samplable Distributions from the Two-Source Extractor RecipeJustin Oh, Ronen ShaltielSTOC 2026 · 2 citations
- Leakage-Resilient Extractors against Number-on-Forehead ProtocolsEshan Chattopadhyay, Jesse GoodmanSTOC 2025 · 1 citation
- Extractors for adversarial sources via extremal hypergraphsEshan Chattopadhyay, Jesse Goodman, Vipul Goyal, Xin LiSTOC 2020 · 1 citation
- Universal Computational Extractors and Multi-Bit AIPO from Lattice AssumptionsYilei Chen, Xinyu MaoEUROCRYPT 2025 · 1 citation
