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USENIX Security2025Top-tier venue

TETD: Trusted Execution in Trust Domains

Zhanbo Wang, Jiaxin Zhan, Xuhua Ding, Fengwei Zhang, Ning Hu

Abstract

Intel TDX empowers cloud service providers to construct confidential virtual machines called trust domains (TDs) on x86 platforms. Similar to its counterparts from AMD and Arm, TDX's hardware based protection over integrity and secrecy of virtual machine memory and vCPU states inevitably hinders legitimate virtual machine management such as introspection. At the presence of compromised high-privileged software (e.g., the guest kernel), neither the cloud service provider nor the TD owner can securely carry out a task within the TD. To tackle this problem, we propose TETD, an in-TD trusted execution technique without trusting any TD system software. Our design does not pivot on in-VM privilege layering, a popular approach used in existing VM security enhancement schemes. Instead, we leverage the virtual machine monitor's existing capability of resource management to directly separate memory and vCPU used for trusted execution from the TD system software. We implement a TETD prototype on a TDX server and run extensive experiments. The performance overhead incurred by TETD to the TD depends on the workload. In our benchmark evaluations, the highest toll is about 6.8%. Moreover, our three applications also demonstrate that TETD provides a TD owner a practical and secure foothold at the presence of a compromised kernel.

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Lineage

  • Meltdown: Reading Kernel Memory from User Space cites Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
  • PLATYPUS: Software-based Power Side-Channel Attacks on x86 cites Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
  • PLATYPUS: Software-based Power Side-Channel Attacks on x86 cites Meltdown: Reading Kernel Memory from User Space
  • PLATYPUS: Software-based Power Side-Channel Attacks on x86 cites FPGA-Based Remote Power Side-Channel Attacks
Builds onCited byLeft to right by year; the more cited, the higher.

Builds on29

  1. Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative ExecutionPaul Kocher, Jann Horn, Anders Fogh, Daniel Genkin et al.S&P 2019 · 2,435 citations
  2. Meltdown: Reading Kernel Memory from User SpaceMoritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz, Daniel Gruss, Thomas Prescher et al.USENIX Security 2018 · 1,456 citations
  3. Translation Leak-aside Buffer: Defeating Cache Side-channel Protections with TLB AttacksBen Gras, Kaveh Razavi, Herbert Bos, Cristiano GiuffridaUSENIX Security 2018 · 357 citations
  4. FPGA-Based Remote Power Side-Channel AttacksMark Zhao, G. Edward SuhS&P 2018 · 301 citations
  5. PLATYPUS: Software-based Power Side-Channel Attacks on x86Moritz Lipp, Andreas Kogler, David F. Oswald, Michael Schwarz et al.S&P 2021 · 242 citations

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