USENIX Security2026Top-tier venue
When AIOps Become "AI Oops": Subverting LLM-driven IT Operations via Telemetry Manipulation
Dario Pasquini, Evgenios M. Kornaropoulos, Giuseppe Ateniese, Omer Akgul, Athanasios Theocharis, Petros Efstathopoulos
Abstract
AI for IT Operations (AIOps) is transforming how organizations manage complex software systems by automating anomaly detection, incident diagnosis, and remediation. Modern AIOps solutions increasingly rely on autonomous LLMbased agents to interpret telemetry data and take corrective actions with minimal human intervention, promising faster response times and operational cost savings. In this work, we perform the first security analysis of AIOps solutions, showing that, once again, AI-driven automation comes with a profound security cost. We demonstrate that adversaries can manipulate system telemetry to mislead AIOps agents into taking actions that compromise the integrity of the infrastructure they manage. We introduce techniques to reliably inject telemetry data using error-inducing requests that influence agent behavior through a form of adversarial input we call adversarial reward-hacking-plausible but incorrect system error interpretations that steer the agent's decision-making. Our attack methodology, AIOpsDoom, is fully automated-combining reconnaissance, fuzzing, and LLM-driven adversarial input generation-and operates without any prior knowledge of the target system. To counter this threat, we propose AIOpsShield, a defense mechanism that sanitizes telemetry data by exploiting its structured nature and the minimal role of user-generated content. Our experiments show that AIOpsShield reliably blocks telemetry-based attacks without affecting normal agent performance. Ultimately, this work exposes AIOps as an emerging attack vector for system compromise and underscores the urgent need for security-aware AIOps design.
Ask about this paper
Your agent reads all of it.
Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.
Builds on8
- Formalizing and Benchmarking Prompt Injection Attacks and DefensesYupei Liu, Yuqi Jia, Runpeng Geng, Jinyuan Jia et al.USENIX Security 2024 · 308 citations
- Automatic Root Cause Analysis via Large Language Models for Cloud IncidentsYinfang Chen, Huaibing Xie, Minghua Ma, Yu Kang et al.EuroSys 2024 · 175 citations
- Benchmarking and Defending against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on Large Language ModelsJingwei Yi, Yueqi Xie, Bin Zhu, Emre Kiciman et al.KDD 2025 · 27 citations
- LLM Whisperer: An Inconspicuous Attack to Bias LLM ResponsesWeiran Lin, Anna Gerchanovsky, Omer Akgul, Lujo Bauer et al.CHI 2025 · 23 citations
- OpenRCA: Can Large Language Models Locate the Root Cause of Software Failures?Junjielong Xu, Qinan Zhang, Zhiqing Zhong, Shilin He et al.ICLR 2025
Related papers
- CoP: Agentic Red-teaming for Large Language Models using Composition of PrinciplesChen Xiong, Pin-Yu Chen, Tsung-Yi HoNeurIPS 2025 · 13 citations
- UDora: A Unified Red Teaming Framework against LLM Agents by Dynamically Hijacking Their Own ReasoningJiawei Zhang, Shuang Yang, Bo LiICML 2025 · 1 citation
- Cloak, Honey, Trap: Proactive Defenses Against LLM AgentsDaniel Ayzenshteyn, Roy Weiss, Yisroel MirskyUSENIX Security 2025
- Mimicking the Familiar: Dynamic Command Generation for Information Theft Attacks in LLM Tool-Learning SystemZiyou Jiang, Mingyang Li, Guowei Yang, Junjie Wang et al.ACL 2025
- Optimizing Agent Planning for Security and AutonomyAashish Kolluri, Rishi Sharma, Manuel Costa, Boris Köpf et al.ICLR 2026 · 11 citations
