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Boosting Few-Pixel Robustness Verification via Covering Verification Designs

Yuval Shapira, Naor Wiesel, Shahar Shabelman, Dana Drachsler-Cohen

2024Year
2Citations
1Top-tier citations

Abstract

Proving local robustness is crucial to increase the reliability of neural networks. While many verifiers prove robustness in L∞ ϵ-balls, very little work deals with robustness verification in L0 ϵ-balls, capturing robustness to few pixel attacks. This verification introduces a combinatorial challenge, because the space of pixels to perturb is discrete and of exponential size. A previous work relies on covering designs to identify sets for defining L∞ neighborhoods, which if proven robust imply that the L0 ϵ-ball is robust. However, the number of neighborhoods to verify remains very high, leading to a high analysis time. We propose covering verification designs, a combinatorial design that tailors effective but analysis-incompatible coverings to L0 robustness verification. The challenge is that computing a covering verification design introduces a high time and memory overhead, which is intensified in our setting, where multiple candidate coverings are required to identify how to reduce the overall analysis time. We introduce CoVerD, an L0 robustness verifier that selects between different candidate coverings without constructing them, but by predicting their block size distribution. This prediction relies on a theorem providing closed-form expressions for the mean and variance of this distribution. CoVerD constructs the chosen covering verification design on-the-fly, while keeping the memory consumption minimal and enabling to parallelize the analysis. The experimental results show that CoVerD reduces the verification time on average by up to 5.1x compared to prior work and that it scales to larger L0 ϵ-balls.

Neural networks are very successful in various applications, most notably in image recognition tasks [14]. However, neural networks are also vulnerable to adversarial example attacks [32,17]. In an adversarial example attack, an attacker slightly perturbs the input to mislead the network. Many attack models and different kinds of perturbations have been considered for neural networks This preprint has not undergone peer review or any post-submission improvements or corrections. The Version of Record of this contribution is published in

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