USENIX Security2018Top-tier venue
The Dangers of Key Reuse: Practical Attacks on IPsec IKE
Dennis Felsch, Martin Grothe, Jörg Schwenk, Adam Czubak, Marcin Szymanek
Abstract
IPsec enables cryptographic protection of IP packets. It is commonly used to build VPNs (Virtual Private Networks). For key establishment, the IKE (Internet Key Exchange) protocol is used. IKE exists in two versions, each with different modes, different phases, several authentication methods, and configuration options. In this paper, we show that reusing a key pair across different versions and modes of IKE can lead to crossprotocol authentication bypasses, enabling the impersonation of a victim host or network by attackers. We exploit a Bleichenbacher oracle in an IKEv1 mode, where RSA encrypted nonces are used for authentication. Using this exploit, we break these RSA encryption based modes, and in addition break RSA signature based authentication in both IKEv1 and IKEv2. Additionally, we describe an offline dictionary attack against the PSK (Pre-Shared Key) based IKE modes, thus covering all available authentication mechanisms of IKE. We found Bleichenbacher oracles in the IKEv1 implementations of Cisco (CVE-2018-0131), Huawei (CVE-2017-17305), Clavister (CVE-2018-8753), and ZyXEL (CVE-2018-9129). All vendors published fixes or removed the particular authentication method from their devices' firmwares in response to our reports.
Ask about this paper
Your agent reads all of it.
Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.
Your agent calls
Luneget_paper_fulltext
Free to start. No credit card required.
Terminal
Install the CLIlune papers fulltext e63930b9-d9c7-44d1-8a4e-c27f708f877cCited by top-tier papers9
- Partitioning Oracle AttacksJulia Len, Paul Grubbs, Thomas RistenpartUSENIX Security 2021 · 57 citations
- Diffie-Hellman Picture Show: Key Exchange Stories from Commercial VoWiFi DeploymentsGabriel Karl Gegenhuber, Florian Holzbauer, Philipp É. Frenzel, Edgar R. Weippl et al.USENIX Security 2024 · 8 citations
- MVPNalyzer: An Investigative Framework for Auditing the Security & Privacy of Mobile VPNsWayne Wang, Aaron Ortwein, Enrique Sobrados, Robert Stanley et al.NDSS 2026 · 2 citations
- Invisible Adversaries: A Systematic Study of Session Manipulation Attacks on VPNsYuxiang Yang, Ao Wang, Xuewei Feng, Qi Li et al.INFOCOM 2026 · 1 citation
- Bypassing Tunnels: Leaking VPN Client Traffic by Abusing Routing TablesNian Xue, Yashaswi Malla, Zihang Xia, Christina Pöpper et al.USENIX Security 2023
Builds on3
- Systematic Fuzzing and Testing of TLS LibrariesJuraj SomorovskyCCS 2016 · 136 citations
- A Systematic Analysis of the Juniper Dual EC IncidentStephen Checkoway, Jacob Maskiewicz, Christina Garman, Joshua Fried et al.CCS 2016 · 91 citations
- Return Of Bleichenbacher's Oracle Threat (ROBOT)Hanno Böck, Juraj Somorovsky, Craig YoungUSENIX Security 2018 · 69 citations
Related papers
- DROWN: Breaking TLS Using SSLv2Nimrod Aviram, Sebastian Schinzel, Juraj Somorovsky, Nadia Heninger et al.USENIX Security 2016 · 192 citations
- Windows into the Past: Exploiting Legacy Crypto in Modern OS's Kerberos ImplementationMichal Shagam, Eyal RonenUSENIX Security 2024
- The 9 Lives of Bleichenbacher's CAT: New Cache ATtacks on TLS ImplementationsEyal Ronen, Robert Gillham, Daniel Genkin, Adi Shamir et al.S&P 2019 · 59 citations
- Blind In/On-Path Attacks and Applications to VPNsWilliam J. Tolley, Beau Kujath, Mohammad Taha Khan, Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez et al.USENIX Security 2021 · 19 citations
- BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackSDaniele Antonioli, Nils Ole Tippenhauer, Kasper RasmussenS&P 2020 · 90 citations
