A View from the Cockpit: Exploring Pilot Reactions to Attacks on Avionic Systems
Matthew Smith, Martin Strohmeier, Jon Harman, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic
Abstract
—Many wireless communications systems found in aircraft lack standard security mechanisms, leaving them vulnerable to attack. With affordable software-defined radios readily available, a novel threat has emerged which allows a wide range of attackers to easily interfere with wireless avionic systems. Whilst these vulnerabilities are known, predicting their ultimate effect is difficult. A major factor in this effect is how flight crew respond, especially whether their extensive training in fault handling helps them to manage attacks. To investigate this we conducted a user study, inviting 30 Airbus A320 type-rated pilots to fly simulator scenarios in which they were subjected to attacks on their avionics. We use wireless attacks on three safety-related systems, based on existing literature: Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) and the Instrument Landing System (ILS). To analyze their response, we collected control input data coupled with closed and open interview responses. We found that all three attack scenarios created significant control impact and disruption through missed approaches, avoidance maneuvers and diversions. They further increased workload, distrust in the affected system, and for each attack, at least a third of our participants switched off the system entirely—even if they were important safety systems. All pilots felt the scenarios were useful, with 93.3% feeling that simulator training for wireless attacks could be valuable.
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