USENIX Security2018Top-tier venue
The Battle for New York: A Case Study of Applied Digital Threat Modeling at the Enterprise Level
Rock Stevens, Daniel Votipka, Elissa M. Redmiles, Colin Ahern, Patrick Sweeney, Michelle L. Mazurek
Abstract
Digital security professionals use threat modeling to assess and improve the security posture of an organization or product. However, no threat-modeling techniques have been systematically evaluated in a real-world, enterprise environment. In this case study, we introduce formalized threat modeling to New York City Cyber Command: the primary digital defense organization for the most populous city in the United States. We find that threat modeling improved self-efficacy; 20 of 25 participants regularly incorporated it within their daily duties 30 days after training, without further prompting. After 120 days, implemented participantdesigned threat mitigation strategies provided tangible security benefits for NYC, including blocking 541 unique intrusion attempts, preventing the hijacking of five privileged user accounts, and addressing three public-facing server vulnerabilities. Overall, these results suggest that the introduction of threat modeling can provide valuable benefits in an enterprise setting. * We would like to thank the leadership and strategic communications personnel of NYC Cyber Command for making this study possible. Additionally, we would like to thank Lujo Bauer of Carnegie Mellon University for his advice and expertise in shaping this study.
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