Fides: Secure and Scalable Asynchronous DAG Consensus via Trusted Components
Shaokang Xie, Dakai Kang, Hanzheng Lyu, Jianyu Niu, Mohammad Sadoghi
Abstract
DAG-based BFT consensus has attracted growing interest in distributed data management systems for consistent replication in untrusted settings due to its high throughput and resilience to asynchrony. However, existing protocols still suffer from high communication overhead and long commit latency. In parallel, introducing minimal hardware trust has proven effective in reducing the complexity of BFT consensus.
Inspired by these works, we present Fides, an asynchronous DAG-based BFT consensus protocol that, to our knowledge, is among the first to leverage TEEs to enhance both scalability and efficiency. Fides tolerates a minority of Byzantine replicas and achieves O ( kn 2 + n 3 ) metadata communication complexity through a customized TEE-assisted Reliable Broadcast ( T -RBC) primitive with linear communication complexity in one-step broadcast. Building on T-RBC, Fides redefines the DAG construction rules by reducing the reference requirement from 2 f
- 1 to f
- 1 between consecutive vertices. This new structure weakens DAG connectivity and invalidates traditional commit rules, so we formally abstract the problem and derive new theoretical bounds on liveness. We further propose a four-round commit rule that achieves the theoretically minimal commit latency. In addition, we design two primitives, T-RoundCert and T-Coin , to efficiently certify DAG references and replace the costly cryptographic common coin used in prior protocols. Comprehensive evaluations on geo-distributed and local testbeds show that Fides substantially outperforms state-of-the-art protocols, including Tusk, Bullshark, Mysticeti, Shoal++, RCC, Damysus, Achilles and HybridSet, achieving lower latency and higher throughput while preserving strong safety and liveness guarantees.
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