SlowPerception: Physical-World Latency Attack against Camera-based Perception in Autonomous Driving
Chen Ma, Ningfei Wang, Zhengyu Zhao, Qian Wang, Chao Shen
Abstract
Autonomous Driving (AD) systems critically depend on visual perception for real-time object detection and multiple object tracking (MOT) to ensure safe driving. However, high latency in these visual perception components can lead to significant safety risks, such as vehicle collisions. While previous research has extensively explored latency attacks within the digital realm, translating these methods effectively to the physical world presents challenges. For instance, existing attacks rely on perturbations that are unrealistic or impractical for AD, such as adversarial perturbations affecting areas like the sky, or requiring large patches that obscure most of a camera's view, thus making them impossible to be conducted effectively in the real world. In this paper, we introduce SlowPerception, the first physical-world latency attack against AD perception, via generating projector-based universal perturbations. SlowPerception strategically creates numerous phantom objects on various surfaces in the environment, significantly increasing the computational load of Non-Maximum Suppression (NMS) and MOT, thereby inducing substantial latency. Our SlowPerception achieves second-level latency in physical-world settings, with an average latency of 2.5 seconds across different AD perception systems, scenarios, and hardware configurations. This performance significantly outperforms existing state-of-the-art latency attacks. Additionally, we conduct AD system-level impact assessments, such as vehicle collisions, using industry-grade AD systems with production-grade AD simulators with a 97% average rate. We hope that our analyses can inspire further research in this critical domain, enhancing the robustness of AD systems against emerging vulnerabilities.
Ask about this paper
Your agent reads all of it.
Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.
Your agent calls
Luneget_paper_fulltext
Free to start. No credit card required.
Terminal
Install the CLIlune papers fulltext dfcd85ee-27f1-49c7-9039-a10b5cf2265fBuilds on26
- Feature Squeezing: Detecting Adversarial Examples in Deep Neural NetworksWeilin Xu, David Evans, Yanjun QiNDSS 2018 · 1,633 citations
- MagNet: A Two-Pronged Defense against Adversarial ExamplesDongyu Meng, Hao ChenCCS 2017 · 1,295 citations
- On Adaptive Attacks to Adversarial Example DefensesFlorian Tramèr, Nicholas Carlini, Wieland Brendel, Aleksander MadryNeurIPS 2020 · 1,026 citations
- Adversarial Sensor Attack on LiDAR-based Perception in Autonomous DrivingYulong Cao, Chaowei Xiao, Benjamin Cyr, Yimeng Zhou et al.CCS 2019 · 626 citations
- Invisible for both Camera and LiDAR: Security of Multi-Sensor Fusion based Perception in Autonomous Driving Under Physical-World AttacksYulong Cao, Ningfei Wang, Chaowei Xiao, Dawei Yang et al.S&P 2021 · 309 citations
Related papers
- Investigating Physical Latency Attacks Against Camera-Based PerceptionRaymond Muller, Ruoyu Song, Chenyi Wang, Yuxia Zhan et al.S&P 2025
- SlowTrack: Increasing the Latency of Camera-Based Perception in Autonomous Driving Using Adversarial ExamplesChen Ma, Ningfei Wang, Qi Alfred Chen, Chao ShenAAAI 2024 · 44 citations
- SlowLiDAR: Increasing the Latency of LiDAR-Based Detection Using Adversarial ExamplesHan Liu, Yuhao Wu, Zhiyuan Yu, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik et al.CVPR 2023
- CP-FREEZER: Latency Attacks Against Vehicular Cooperative PerceptionChenyi Wang, Ruoyu Song, Raymond Muller, Jean-Philippe Monteuuis et al.AAAI 2026
- ControlLoc: Physical-World Hijacking Attack on Camera-based Perception in Autonomous DrivingChen Ma, Ningfei Wang, Zhengyu Zhao, Qian Wang et al.CCS 2025
