Insecurity of operational cellular IoT service: new vulnerabilities, attacks, and countermeasures
Sihan Wang, Guan-Hua Tu, Xinyu Lei, Tian Xie, Chi-Yu Li, Po-Yi Chou, Fu-Cheng Hsieh, Yiwen Hu, Li Xiao, Chunyi Peng
Abstract
More than 150 cellular networks worldwide have rolled out massive IoT services such as smart metering and environmental monitoring. Such cellular IoT services share the existing cellular network architecture with non-IoT (e.g., smartphone) ones. When they are newly integrated into the cellular network, new security vulnerabilities may happen from imprudent integration. In this work, we explore the security vulnerabilities of the cellular IoT from both system-integrated and service-integrated aspects. We discover five vulnerabilities spanning cellular standard design defects, network operation slips, and IoT device implementation flaws. Threateningly, they allow an adversary to remotely identify IP addresses and phone numbers assigned to cellular IoT devices and launch data/text spamming attacks against them. We experimentally validate these vulnerabilities and attacks with three major U.S. IoT carriers. The attack evaluation result shows that the adversary can raise an IoT data bill by up to 5 per second; moreover, cellular IoT devices may suffer from denial of IoT services. We finally propose, prototype, and evaluate recommended solutions.
• Security and privacy → Mobile and wireless security.
Ask about this paper
Your agent reads all of it.
Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.
Your agent calls
Luneget_paper_fulltext
Free to start. No credit card required.
Terminal
Install the CLIlune papers fulltext de45daa5-596c-4215-a50a-060854443eafCited by top-tier papers3
- CellDAM: User-Space, Rootless Detection and Mitigation for 5G Data PlaneZhaowei Tan, Jinghao Zhao, Boyan Ding, Songwu LuNSDI 2023 · 13 citations
- Uncovering insecure designs of cellular emergency services (911)Yiwen Hu, Min-Yue Chen, Guan-Hua Tu, Chi-Yu Li et al.MobiCom 2022 · 10 citations
- IMS is Not That Secure on Your 5G/4G PhonesJingwen Shi, Sihan Wang, Min-Yue Chen, Guan-Hua Tu et al.MobiCom 2024 · 5 citations
Builds on7
- Breaking LTE on Layer TwoDavid Rupprecht, Katharina Kohls, Thorsten Holz, Christina PöpperS&P 2019 · 219 citations
- Hiding in Plain Signal: Physical Signal Overshadowing Attack on LTEHojoon Yang, Sangwook Bae, Mincheol Son, Hongil Kim et al.USENIX Security 2019 · 127 citations
- New Security Threats Caused by IMS-based SMS Service in 4G LTE NetworksGuan-Hua Tu, Chi-Yu Li, Chunyi Peng, Yuanjie Li et al.CCS 2016 · 60 citations
- Understanding power consumption of NB-IoT in the wild: tool and large-scale measurementDeliang Yang, Xianghui Zhang, Xuan Huang, Liqian Shen et al.MobiCom 2020 · 36 citations
- Disrupting Continuity of Apple's Wireless Ecosystem Security: New Tracking, DoS, and MitM Attacks on iOS and macOS Through Bluetooth Low Energy, AWDL, and Wi-FiMilan Stute, Alexander Heinrich, Jannik Lorenz, Matthias HollickUSENIX Security 2021 · 31 citations
Related papers
- Data-plane signaling in cellular IoT: attacks and defenseZhaowei Tan, Boyan Ding, Jinghao Zhao, Yunqi Guo et al.MobiCom 2021 · 13 citations
- Small Cell, Big Risk: A Security Assessment of 4G LTE Femtocells in the WildYaru Yang, Yiming Zhang, Tao Wan, Haixin Duan et al.NDSS 2026 · 1 citation
- Instructions Unclear: Undefined Behaviour in Cellular Network SpecificationsDaniel Klischies, Moritz Schloegel, Tobias Scharnowski, Mikhail Bogodukhov et al.USENIX Security 2023
- CITesting: Systematic Testing of Context Integrity Violations in LTE Core NetworksMincheol Son, Kwangmin Kim, Beomseok Oh, CheolJun Park et al.CCS 2025
- AdaptOver: adaptive overshadowing attacks in cellular networksSimon Erni, Martin Kotuliak, Patrick Leu, Marc Roeschlin et al.MobiCom 2022 · 52 citations
