Physical Invisible Backdoor Based on Camera Imaging
Yusheng Guo, Nan Zhong, Zhenxing Qian, Xinpeng Zhang
Abstract
Backdoor attack aims to compromise a model, which returns an adversary-wanted output when a specific trigger pattern appears yet behaves normally for clean inputs. Current backdoor attacks require changing pixels of clean images, which results in poor stealthiness of attacks and increases the difficulty of the physical implementation. This paper proposes a novel physical invisible backdoor based on camera imaging without changing nature image pixels. Specifically, a compromised model returns a target label for images taken by a particular camera, while it returns correct results for other images. To implement and evaluate the proposed backdoor, we take shots of different objects from multi-angles using multiple smartphones to build a new dataset of 21,500 images. Conventional backdoor attacks work ineffectively with some classical models, such as ResNet18, over the above-mentioned dataset. Therefore, we propose a three-step training strategy to mount the backdoor attack. First, we design and train a camera identification model with the phone IDs to extract the camera fingerprint feature. Subsequently, we elaborate a special network architecture, which is easily compromised by our backdoor attack, by leveraging the attributes of the CFA interpolation algorithm and combining it with the feature extraction block in the camera identification model. Finally, we transfer the backdoor from the elaborated special network architecture to the classical architecture model via teacher-student distillation learning. Since the trigger of our method is related to the specific phone, our attack works effectively in the physical world. Experiment results demonstrate the feasibility of our proposed approach and robustness against various backdoor defences.
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