Reliable Poisoned Sample Detection against Backdoor Attacks Enhanced by Sharpness Aware Minimization
Mingda Zhang, Mingli Zhu, Zihao Zhu, Li Shen, Baoyuan Wu
Abstract
Backdoor attack has been considered as a serious security threat to deep neural networks (DNNs). Poisoned sample detection (PSD) that aims at filtering out poisoned samples from an untrustworthy training dataset has shown very promising performance for defending against data poisoning based backdoor attacks. However, we observe that the detection performance of many advanced methods is likely to be unstable when facing weak backdoor attacks, such as low poisoning ratio or weak trigger strength. To further verify this observation, we make a statistical investigation among various backdoor attacks and poisoned sample detections, showing a positive correlation between backdoor effect and detection performance. It inspires us to strengthen the backdoor effect to enhance detection performance. Since we cannot achieve that goal via directly manipulating poisoning ratio or trigger strength, we propose to train one model using the Sharpness-Aware Minimization (SAM) algorithm, rather than the vanilla training algorithm. We also provide both empirical and theoretical analysis about how SAM training strengthens the backdoor effect. Then, this SAM trained model can be seamlessly integrated with any off-the-shelf PSD method that extracts discriminative features from the trained model for detection, called SAM-enhanced PSD. Extensive experiments on several benchmark datasets show the reliable detection performance of the proposed method against both weak and strong backdoor attacks, with significant improvements against various attacks (+34.38% TPR on average), over the conventional PSD methods (i.e., without SAM enhancement). Overall, this work provides new insights about PSD and proposes a novel approach that can complement existing detection methods, which may inspire more in-depth explorations in this field. Figure 1 . T-SNE visualizations for the impact of poisoning ratios and trigger strengths on backdoor attacks. The top row shows backdoor attacks with a higher poisoning ratio (5%) and blending ratio (0.2), while the bottom row shows results of weak attacks with a poisoning ratio of 1% and a blending ratio of 0.1.
Ask about this paper
Your agent reads all of it.
Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.
Your agent calls
Luneget_paper_fulltext
Free to start. No credit card required.
Terminal
Install the CLIlune papers fulltext d84e3c35-c779-42e9-ac22-9dcf9d3aae50Builds on25
- Sharpness-aware Minimization for Efficiently Improving GeneralizationPierre Foret, Ariel Kleiner, Hossein Mobahi, Behnam NeyshaburICLR 2021 · 1,861 citations
- Trojaning Attack on Neural NetworksYingqi Liu, Shiqing Ma, Yousra Aafer, Wen-Chuan Lee et al.NDSS 2018 · 1,377 citations
- Invisible Backdoor Attack with Sample-Specific TriggersYuezun Li, Yiming Li, Baoyuan Wu, Longkang Li et al.ICCV 2021 · 639 citations
- Anti-Backdoor Learning: Training Clean Models on Poisoned DataYige Li, Xixiang Lyu, Nodens Koren, Lingjuan Lyu et al.NeurIPS 2021 · 503 citations
- Adversarial Neuron Pruning Purifies Backdoored Deep ModelsDongxian Wu, Yisen WangNeurIPS 2021 · 441 citations
Related papers
- Enhancing Fine-Tuning based Backdoor Defense with Sharpness-Aware MinimizationMingli Zhu, Shaokui Wei, Li Shen, Yanbo Fan et al.ICCV 2023 · 95 citations
- Beating Backdoor Attack at Its Own GameMin Liu, Alberto L. Sangiovanni-Vincentelli, Xiangyu YueICCV 2023 · 19 citations
- Towards A Proactive ML Approach for Detecting Backdoor Poison SamplesXiangyu Qi, Tinghao Xie, Jiachen T. Wang, Tong Wu et al.USENIX Security 2023
- Adversarial-Inspired Backdoor Defense via Bridging Backdoor and Adversarial AttacksJia-Li Yin, Weijian Wang, Lyhwa, Wei Lin et al.AAAI 2025 · 9 citations
- PSBD: Prediction Shift Uncertainty Unlocks Backdoor DetectionWei Li, Pin-Yu Chen, Sijia Liu, Ren WangCVPR 2025
