USENIX Security2023Top-tier venue
One Size Does not Fit All: Quantifying the Risk of Malicious App Encounters for Different Android User Profiles
Savino Dambra, Leyla Bilge, Platon Kotzias, Yun Shen, Juan Caballero
Abstract
Previous work has investigated the particularities of security practices within specific user communities defined based on country of origin, age, prior tech abuse, and economic status. Their results highlight that current security solutions that adopt a one-size-fits-all-users approach ignore the differences and needs of particular user communities. However, those works focus on a single community or cluster users into hard-to-interpret sub-populations. In this work, we perform a large-scale quantitative analysis of the risk of encountering malware and other potentially unwanted applications (PUA) across user communities. At the core of our study is a dataset of app installation logs collected from 12M Android mobile devices. Leveraging user-installed apps, we define intuitive profiles based on users' interests (e.g., gamers and investors), and fit a subset of 5.4M devices to those profiles. Our analysis is structured in three parts. First, we perform risk analysis on the whole population to measure how the risk of malicious app encounters is affected by different factors. Next, we create different profiles to investigate whether risk differences across users may be due to their interests. Finally, we compare a per-profile approach for classifying clean and infected devices with the classical approach that considers the whole population. We observe that features such as the diversity of the app signers and the use of alternative markets highly correlate with the risk of malicious app encounters. We also discover that some profiles such as gamers and social-media users are exposed to more than twice the risks experienced by the average users. We also show that the classification outcome has a marked accuracy improvement when using a per-profile approach to train the prediction models. Overall, our results confirm the inadequacy of one-size-fits-all protection solutions.
Ask about this paper
Your agent reads all of it.
Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.
Your agent calls
Luneget_paper_fulltext
Free to start. No credit card required.
Terminal
Install the CLIlune papers fulltext d5220dba-236e-4a9d-8e04-891f4c5bfb84Builds on18
- The Spyware Used in Intimate Partner ViolenceRahul Chatterjee, Periwinkle Doerfler, Hadas Orgad, Sam Havron et al.S&P 2018 · 167 citations
- An Analysis of Pre-installed Android SoftwareJulien Gamba, Mohammed Rashed, Abbas Razaghpanah, Juan Tapiador et al.S&P 2020 · 105 citations
- SoK: A Framework for Unifying At-Risk User ResearchNoel Warford, Tara Matthews, Kaitlyn Yang, Omer Akgul et al.S&P 2022 · 101 citations
- RiskTeller: Predicting the Risk of Cyber IncidentsLeyla Bilge, Yufei Han, Matteo Dell'AmicoCCS 2017 · 92 citations
- Measuring PUP Prevalence and PUP Distribution through Pay-Per-Install ServicesPlaton Kotzias, Leyla Bilge, Juan CaballeroUSENIX Security 2016 · 74 citations
Related papers
- How Did That Get In My Phone? Unwanted App Distribution on Android DevicesPlaton Kotzias, Juan Caballero, Leyla BilgeS&P 2021 · 37 citations
- Understanding Worldwide Private Information Collection on AndroidYun Shen, Pierre-Antoine Vervier, Gianluca StringhiniNDSS 2021
- Trouble Over-The-Air: An Analysis of FOTA Apps in the Android EcosystemEduardo Blázquez, Sergio Pastrana, Álvaro Feal, Julien Gamba et al.S&P 2021 · 21 citations
- A Large-scale Temporal Measurement of Android Malicious Apps: Persistence, Migration, and Lessons LearnedYun Shen, Pierre-Antoine Vervier, Gianluca StringhiniUSENIX Security 2022
- Investigating Commercial Pay-Per-Install and the Distribution of Unwanted SoftwareKurt Thomas, Juan A. Elices Crespo, Ryan Rasti, Jean-Michel Picod et al.USENIX Security 2016 · 77 citations
