One Click to Leak: Characterizing the Real-World Usage and Threat Impact of MNO-based Single Sign-On Websites

Mobile Network Operator (MNO)-based Single Sign-On (MSSO) is a password-free authentication framework relying on mobile data sessions. Unlike traditional SSO, it shifts the Identity Provider (IdP) to the MNO and the authentication anchor to the Service Provider (SP). MSSO is increasingly deployed and has expanded from mobile apps to websites, yet its web ecosystem and security risks remain largely unexplored. We analyze mainstream MSSO deployments and identify a 3-phase workflow with three trust defects enabling trust hijacking. We further demonstrate One-Click-to-Leak (OCL) attacks, where a single webpage visit can leak sensitive identity information (e.g., phone numbers). With a leading security company, we conduct the first large-scale, longitudinal study of web-based MSSO. We design a hierarchical detection framework using passive DNS correlations and URL reconstruction from search data to identify MSSO-enabled websites. Over one year, we identified 116,852 website URLs across 729 apex domains. Of these URLs, 73.6% exhibit at least one trust defect: 69.4% expose developer credentials, and 27.1% issue high-privilege tokens before user consent, indicating widespread OCL-enabling trust defects. Among the 729 apex domains, 31.8% rely on Resellers, obscuring the downstream SP from the MNO in the analyzed flows. Script analysis identifies 101 websites strongly associated with OCL attack behavior. With our partner, we trace a representative upstream platform subsequently seized by law enforcement and uncover a monetized underground ecosystem. Sanitized backend data shows that it collected 14,100 users'phone numbers within three days and linked them to sensitive information such as browsing activity. Our work provides a comprehensive study of web-based MSSO deployment and security implications. Through responsible disclosure, our work helps secure the mobile authentication ecosystem.