USENIX Security2025Top-tier venue
Misty Registry: An Empirical Study of Flawed Domain Registry Operation
Mingming Zhang, Yunyi Zhang, Baojun Liu, Haixin Duan, Min Zhang, Fan Shi, Chengxi Xu
Abstract
Domain registries manage the entire lifecycle of domain names within TLDs and interact with domain registrars through the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) specification. Although they adhere to standard policies, EPP implementations and operational practices can vary between registries. Even minor operational flaws at registries can expose their managed resources to abuse. However, registry operations' closed and opaque nature has limited understanding of these practices and their potential threats. In this study, we systematically analyzed the security of EPP operations across TLD registries. By analyzing the entire domain lifecycle and mapping operations to corresponding domain statuses, we discovered that registry operations are attributed to overlapping statuses and complex triggering factors. To uncover flaws in registry operations, we employed diverse data sources, including TLD zone files, historical domain registration data, and real-time registrar interfaces for comprehensive domain statuses. The analysis combined static and dynamic techniques, allowing us to externally assess domain existence and registration status, thereby revealing the inner workings of registry policies. Eventually, we discovered three novel EPP implementation deficiencies that pose domain abuse risks in major registries, including Identity Digital, Google, and Nominet. Evidence has shown that adversaries are covertly exploiting these vulnerabilities. Our experiments reveal that over 1.6 million domain names, spanning more than 50% of TLDs (e.g., .app and .top), are vulnerable due to these flawed operations. To address these issues, we responsibly disclosed the problem to the affected registries and assisted in implementing a solution. We believe that these registry operation issues require increased attention from the community.
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Lineage
- Zombie Awakening: Stealthy Hijacking of Active Domains through DNS Hosting Referral cites All Your DNS Records Point to Us: Understanding the Security Threats of Dangling DNS Records
- Rethinking the Security Threats of Stale DNS Glue Records cites All Your DNS Records Point to Us: Understanding the Security Threats of Dangling DNS Records
- Rethinking the Security Threats of Stale DNS Glue Records cites Zombie Awakening: Stealthy Hijacking of Active Domains through DNS Hosting Referral
Builds on7
- All Your DNS Records Point to Us: Understanding the Security Threats of Dangling DNS RecordsDaiping Liu, Shuai Hao, Haining WangCCS 2016 · 91 citations
- Game of Registrars: An Empirical Analysis of Post-Expiration Domain Name TakeoversTobias Lauinger, Abdelberi Chaabane, Ahmet Salih Buyukkayhan, Kaan Onarlioglu et al.USENIX Security 2017 · 39 citations
- Assessing Browser-level Defense against IDN-based PhishingHang Hu, Steve T. K. Jan, Yang Wang, Gang WangUSENIX Security 2021 · 22 citations
- Zombie Awakening: Stealthy Hijacking of Active Domains through DNS Hosting ReferralEihal Alowaisheq, Siyuan Tang, Zhihao Wang, Fatemah Alharbi et al.CCS 2020 · 19 citations
- Rethinking the Security Threats of Stale DNS Glue RecordsYunyi Zhang, Baojun Liu, Haixin Duan, Min Zhang et al.USENIX Security 2024 · 9 citations
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