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MileSan: Detecting Exploitable Microarchitectural Leakage via Differential Hardware-Software Taint Tracking

Tobias Kovats, Flavien Solt, Katharina Ceesay-Seitz, Kaveh Razavi

Abstract

Microarchitectural performance optimizations introduce information flows inside CPU implementations that exceed those defined by the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA). Microarchitectural vulnerabilities, such as constant-time violations and various classes of transient execution attacks, are subsets of these excessive information flows. We observe that an exploitable microarchitectural leakage is an excessive information flow that can affect the time it takes for the CPU to execute a particular instruction, creating a timing covert channel. We design MileSan, the first RTL sanitizer that is capable of detecting exploitable microarchitectural leakage by checking for the architecturally-observable differences between architectural and microarchitectural information flows. For a given program and CPU implementation, MileSan computes architectural flows using software taint tracking and microarchitectural flows using RTL taint tracking. Evaluating the exploitability of proof of concepts generated by previous microarchitectural fuzzers, we find cases that are in fact not exploitable and discover the particular microarchitectural components that enable exploitation for the rest. In addition to assessing exploitability, MileSan enables the generation of random test programs with strictly-defined architectural information flows of secret data using a novel technique called taint-aware in-situ simulation. Leveraging this capability, we build RandOS, a new microarchitectural fuzzer that generates random programs traversing different privilege levels and address spaces, akin to random operating systems. Evaluation using five RISC-V CPUs shows that RandOS not only detects known exploitable vulnerabilities 4.5× faster than the state of the art, but also discovers 19 new constant-time violations and transient execution vulnerabilities in well-tested CPUs, such as BOOM, CVA6 and OpenC910.

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Lineage

  • ZombieLoad: Cross-Privilege-Boundary Data Sampling cites Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
  • ZombieLoad: Cross-Privilege-Boundary Data Sampling cites Translation Leak-aside Buffer: Defeating Cache Side-channel Protections with TLB Attacks
  • RIDL: Rogue In-Flight Data Load cites Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
  • RIDL: Rogue In-Flight Data Load cites Foreshadow: Extracting the Keys to the Intel SGX Kingdom with Transient Out-of-Order Execution
  • Foreshadow: Extracting the Keys to the Intel SGX Kingdom with Transient Out-of-Order Execution cites Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
Builds onCited byLeft to right by year; the more cited, the higher.

Builds on30

  1. Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative ExecutionPaul Kocher, Jann Horn, Anders Fogh, Daniel Genkin et al.S&P 2019 · 2,435 citations
  2. Foreshadow: Extracting the Keys to the Intel SGX Kingdom with Transient Out-of-Order ExecutionJo Van Bulck, Marina Minkin, Ofir Weisse, Daniel Genkin et al.USENIX Security 2018 · 1,175 citations
  3. ZombieLoad: Cross-Privilege-Boundary Data SamplingMichael Schwarz, Moritz Lipp, Daniel Moghimi, Jo Van Bulck et al.CCS 2019 · 464 citations
  4. RIDL: Rogue In-Flight Data LoadStephan van Schaik, Alyssa Milburn, Sebastian Österlund, Pietro Frigo et al.S&P 2019 · 408 citations
  5. Translation Leak-aside Buffer: Defeating Cache Side-channel Protections with TLB AttacksBen Gras, Kaveh Razavi, Herbert Bos, Cristiano GiuffridaUSENIX Security 2018 · 357 citations

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