Draco: A System for Uniform and Fine-grained Access Control for Web Code on Android
Güliz Seray Tuncay, Soteris Demetriou, Carl A. Gunter
Abstract
In-app embedded browsers are commonly used by app developers to display web content without having to redirect the user to heavyweight web browsers. Just like the conventional web browsers, embedded browsers can allow the execution of web code. In addition, they provide mechanisms (viz., JavaScript bridges) to give web code access to internal app code that might implement critical functionalities and expose device resources. This is intrinsically dangerous since there is currently no means for app developers to perform origin-based access control on the JavaScript bridges, and any web code running in an embedded browser is free to use all the exposed app and device resources. Previous work that addresses this problem provided access control solutions that work only for apps that are built using hybrid frameworks. Additionally, these solutions focused on protecting only the parts of JavaScript bridges that expose permissions-protected resources. In this work, our goal is to provide a generic solution that works for all apps that utilize embedded web browsers and protects all channels that give access to internal app and device resources. Towards realizing this goal, we built Draco, a uniform and fine-grained access control framework for web code running on Android embedded browsers (viz., WebView). Draco provides a declarative policy language that allows developers to define policies to specify the desired access characteristics of web origins in a fine-grained fashion, and a runtime system that dynamically enforces the policies. In contrast with previous work, we do not assume any modifications to the Android operating system, and implement Draco in the Chromium Android System WebView app to enable seamless deployment. Our evaluation of the the Draco runtime system shows that Draco incurs negligible overhead, which is in the order of microseconds.
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