SoSBench: Benchmarking Safety Alignment on Six Scientific Domains
Fengqing Jiang, Fengbo Ma, Zhangchen Xu, Yuetai Li, Zixin Rao, Bhaskar Ramasubramanian, Luyao Niu, Bo Li, Xianyan Chen, Zhen Xiang, Radha Poovendran
Abstract
3 WWU 4 UIUC † Equal contribution ‡ Corresponding Author Large language models (LLMs) exhibit advancing capabilities in complex tasks, such as reasoning and graduate-level question answering, yet their resilience against misuse, particularly involving scientifically sophisticated risks, remains underexplored. Existing safety benchmarks typically focus either on instructions requiring minimal knowledge comprehension (e.g., "tell me how to build a bomb") or utilize prompts that are relatively low-risk (e.g., multiple-choice or classification tasks about hazardous content). Consequently, they fail to adequately assess model safety when handling knowledge-intensive, hazardous scenarios. To address this critical gap, we introduce SoSBench, a regulation-grounded, hazard-focused benchmark encompassing six selected high-risk scientific domains: chemistry, biology, medicine, pharmacology, physics, and psychology. The benchmark comprises 3,000 prompts derived from real-world regulations and laws, systematically expanded via an LLM-assisted evolutionary pipeline that introduces diverse, realistic misuse scenarios (e.g., detailed explosive synthesis instructions involving advanced chemical formulas). We evaluate frontier LLMs within a unified framework using our SoSBench. Despite their alignment claims, advanced models consistently disclose disallowed content across all domains, demonstrating alarmingly high rates of policy-violation responses (e.g., 84.9% for Deepseek-R1 and 50.3% for GPT-4.1). These results highlight significant safety alignment deficiencies and underscore urgent concerns regarding the responsible deployment of powerful LLMs.
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