CHERI-SIMT: Implementing Capability Memory Protection in GPUs
Matthew Naylor, Alexandre Joannou, A. Theodore Markettos, Paul Metzger, Simon W. Moore, Timothy M. Jones
Abstract
Governments are increasingly advising software manufacturers to employ memory-safe languages and technologies to combat adversarial attacks on modern computing infrastructure. This introduces pressures across the entire computing industry, including GPU vendors who provide implementations of unsafe C/C++-based languages, such as CUDA and OpenCL, for programming the devices they produce. One of the memory-safety technologies being recommended is Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions (CHERI). CHERI builds strong and efficient memory safety into underlying instruction-set architectures allowing continued, but memory-safe, use of C/C++-based languages on top.
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