Lune

CCS2025Top-tier venue

Exploiting the Shared Storage API

Alexandra Nisenoff, Deian Stefan, Nicolas Christin

2025Year
1Top-tier citations

Abstract

As part of an effort to replace third-party cookies, Google introduced the Shared Storage API as one of their ''Privacy Sandbox'' proposals. The Shared Storage API seeks to replace some of the benign functionalities that third-party cookies facilitate while mitigating the potential privacy harms that they can cause, such as reidentifying users across websites. Shared Storage seeks to do this by allowing third parties to store data that is not partitioned by top-level website, but limiting read access to those data. We find that the implementation and design of the API have flaws that allow for both the reidentification of users across sites and the leakage of more data than intended by Google. With the API being deployed in Google Chrome and major advertisers and trackers having completed the processes required to gain access to the API, the Shared Storage API may not do as much as intended to improve the state of privacy on the web. We present several attacks on the API that circumvent the key goals laid out by Google as well as discuss potential extensions and mitigation strategies. While we have responsibly disclosed our attacks to Google, most attacks remain possible in Chrome.

Ask about this paper

Your agent reads all of it.

Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.

Questions to start from

Your agent calls

Luneget_paper_fulltext

Ask in Lune

Free to start. No credit card required.

lune papers fulltext bb1300d7-fba3-468a-95f2-1d4ffb109dc9

Cited by top-tier papers1

Ask how each one uses it

Builds on16

Related papers

Dusk over the sea between two cliffs drawn in fine vertical lines