Launching Smart Selective Jamming Attacks in WirelessHART Networks
Xia Cheng, Junyang Shi, Mo Sha, Linke Guo
Abstract
As a leading industrial wireless standard, WirelessHART has been widely implemented to build wireless sensor-actuator networks (WSANs) in industrial facilities, such as oil refineries, chemical plants, and factories. For instance, 54,835 WSANs that implement the WirelessHART standard have been deployed globally by Emerson process management, a WirelessHART network supplier, to support process automation. While the existing research to improve industrial WSANs focuses mainly on enhancing network performance, the security aspects have not been given enough attention. We have identified a new threat to WirelessHART networks, namely smart selective jamming attacks, where the attacker first cracks the channel usage, routes, and parameter configuration of the victim network and then jams the transmissions of interest on their specific communication channels in their specific time slots, which makes the attacks energy efficient and hardly detectable. In this paper, we present this severe, stealthy threat by demonstrating the step-by-step attack process on a 50-node network that runs a publicly accessible WirelessHART implementation. Experimental results show that the smart selective jamming attacks significantly reduce the network reliability without triggering network updates.
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