SpiderMon: Towards Using Cell Towers as Illuminating Sources for Keystroke Monitoring
Kang Ling, Yuntang Liu, Ke Sun, Wei Wang, Lei Xie, Qing Gu
Abstract
Cellular network operators deploy base stations with a high density to ensure radio signal coverage for 4G/5G networks. While users enjoy the high-speed connection provided by cellular networks, an adversary could exploit the dense cellular deployment to detect nearby human movements and even recognize keystroke movements of a victim by passively listening to the CRS broadcast from base stations. To demonstrate this, we develop SpiderMon, the first attempt to perform passive continuous keystroke monitoring using the signal transmitted by commercial cellular base stations. Our experimental results show that SpiderMon can detect keystroke movements at a distance of 15 meters and can recover a 6-digits PIN input with a success rate of more than 51% within ten trials when the victim is behind the wall.
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Install the CLIlune papers get a86929bc-1baf-4ff5-b53a-4549ec71e5abCited by top-tier papers3
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