Themis: An On-Site Voting System with Systematic Cast-as-intended Verification and Partial Accountability
Mikael Bougon, Hervé Chabanne, Véronique Cortier, Alexandre Debant, Emmanuelle Dottax, Jannik Dreier, Pierrick Gaudry, Mathieu Turuani
Abstract
We propose an on-site voting system Themis, that aims at improving security when local authorities are not fully trusted. Voters vote thanks to voting sheets as well as smart cards that produce encrypted ballots. Electronic ballots are systematically audited, without compromising privacy. Moreover, the system includes a precise dispute resolution procedure identifying misbehaving parties in most cases.
We conduct a full formal analysis of Themis using ProVerif, with a novel approach in order to cover the modular arithmetic needed in our protocol. In order to evaluate the usability of our system, we organized a voting experiment on a (small) group of voters.
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