Lune

CCS2025Top-tier venue

Jazzline: Composable CryptoLine Functional Correctness Proofs for Jasmin Programs

José Bacelar Almeida, Manuel Barbosa, Gilles Barthe, Lionel Blatter, Gustavo Xavier Delerue Marinho Alves, João Diogo Duarte, Benjamin Grégoire, Tiago Oliveira, Miguel Quaresma, Pierre-Yves Strub, Ming-Hsien Tsai, Bow-Yaw Wang, Bo-Yin Yang

2025Year

Abstract

Jasmin is a programming language for high-speed and high-assurance cryptography. Correctness proofs of Jasmin programs are typically carried out deductively in EasyCrypt. This allows generality, modularity and composable reasoning, but does not scale well for low-level architecture-specific routines. CryptoLine offers a semi-automatic approach to formally verify algebraically-rich low-level cryptographic routines. CryptoLine proofs are self-contained: they are not integrated into higher-level formal verification developments. This paper shows how to soundly use CryptoLine to discharge subgoals in functional correctness proofs for complex Jasmin programs. We extend Jasmin with annotations and provide an automatic translation into a CryptoLine model, where most complex transformations are certified. We also formalize and implement the automatic extraction of the semantics of a CryptoLine proof to EasyCrypt. Our motivating use-case is the X-Wing hybrid KEM, for which we present the first formally verified implementation.

Ask about this paper

Your agent reads all of it.

Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.

Questions to start from

Your agent calls

Luneget_paper_fulltext

Ask in Lune

Free to start. No credit card required.

lune papers fulltext a58bbfda-d37a-49e2-bcb4-6a9891ad2d91

Builds on9

Related papers

Dusk over the sea between two cliffs drawn in fine vertical lines