Eavesdropping user credentials via GPU side channels on smartphones
Boyuan Yang, Ruirong Chen, Kai Huang, Jun Yang, Wei Gao
Abstract
Graphics Processing Unit (GPU) on smartphones is an effective target for hardware attacks. In this paper, we present a new side channel attack on mobile GPUs of Android smartphones, allowing an unprivileged attacker to eavesdrop the user's credentials, such as login usernames and passwords, from their inputs through on-screen keyboard. Our attack targets on Qualcomm Adreno GPUs and investigate the amount of GPU overdraw when rendering the popups of user's key presses of inputs. Such GPU overdraw caused by each key press corresponds to unique variations of selected GPU performance counters, from which these key presses can be accurately inferred. Experiment results from practical use on multiple models of Android smartphones show that our attack can correctly infer more than 80% of user's credential inputs, but incur negligible amounts of computing overhead and network traffic on the victim device. To counter this attack, this paper suggests mitigations of access control on GPU performance counters, or applying obfuscations on the values of GPU performance counters.
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Install the CLIlune papers fulltext a3af312a-8233-49e7-bedc-e1dfdec97db0Cited by top-tier papers6
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