Pricing Query Complexity of Revenue Maximization
Renato Paes Leme, Balasubramanian Sivan, Yifeng Teng, Pratik Worah
Abstract
The common way to optimize auction and pricing systems is to set aside a small fraction of the traffic to run experiments. This leads to the question: how can we learn the most with the smallest amount of data? For truthful auctions, this is the sample complexity problem. For posted price auctions, we no longer have access to samples. Instead, the algorithm is allowed to choose a price pt; then for a fresh sample vt D we learn the sign st = sign(pt — vt) ∈ -1, +1. How many pricing queries are needed to estimate a given parameter of the underlying distribution? We give tight upper and lower bounds on the number of pricing queries required to find an approximately optimal reserve price for general, regular and MHR distributions. Interestingly, for regular distributions, the pricing query and sample complexities match. But for general and MHR distributions, we show a strict separation between them. All known results on sample complexity for revenue optimization follow from a variant of using the optimal reserve price of the empirical distribution. In the pricing query complexity setting, we show that learning the entire distribution within an error of ε in Levy distance requires strictly more pricing queries than to estimate the reserve. Instead, our algorithm uses a new property we identify called relative flatness to quickly zoom into the right region of the distribution to get the optimal pricing query complexity. * The full version of the paper can be accessed at https://arxiv.org/abs/2111.03158
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