ERACAN: Defending Against an Emerging CAN Threat Model
Zhaozhou Tang, Khaled Serag, Saman A. Zonouz, Z. Berkay Celik, Dongyan Xu, Raheem Beyah
Abstract
The Controller Area Network (CAN) is a pivotal communication protocol extensively utilized in vehicles, aircraft, factories, and diverse cyber-physical systems (CPSs). The extensive CAN security literature resulting from decades of wide usage may create an impression of thorough scrutiny. However, a closer look reveals its reliance on a specific threat model with a limited range of abilities. Notably, recent works show that this model is outdated and that a more potent and versatile model could soon become the norm, prompting the need for a new defense paradigm. Unfortunately, the security impact of this emerging model on CAN systems has not received sufficient attention, and the defense systems addressing it are almost nonexistent. In this paper, we introduce ERACAN, the first comprehensive defense system against this new threat model. We first begin with a threat analysis to ensure that ERACAN comprehensively understands this model's capabilities, evasion tactics, and propensity to enable new attacks or enhance existing ones. ERACAN offers versatile protection against this spectrum of threats, providing attack detection, classification, and optional prevention abilities. We implement and evaluate ERACAN on a testbed and a real vehicle's CAN bus to demonstrate its low latency, real-time operation, and protective capabilities. ERACAN achieves detection rates of 100% and 99.7%+ for all attacks launched by the conventional and the enhanced threat models, respectively.
Ask about this paper
Ask your agent about it.
Lune has read the top-tier papers around this one, so every answer names the papers it rests on.
Cited by top-tier papers3
- A Sea of Cyber Threats: Maritime Cybersecurity from the Perspective of MarinersAnna Raymaker, Akshaya Kumar, Miuyin Yong Wong, Ryan Pickren et al.CCS 2025 · 5 citations
- Cloud-Native Carjacking: Fleet-wide Compromise via Telematics Authorization FailuresYangyang Liu, Zhengjie Du, Xiaofang Wang, Yang Yin et al.USENIX Security 2026
- A Formal Security Analysis of CAN XLZhaozhou Tang, Khaled Serag, Z. Berkay Celik, Vijay Ganesh et al.USENIX Security 2026
Related papers
- ZBCAN: A Zero-Byte CAN Defense SystemKhaled Serag, Rohit Bhatia, Akram Faqih, Muslum Ozgur Ozmen et al.USENIX Security 2023
- Error Handling of In-vehicle Networks Makes Them VulnerableKyong-Tak Cho, Kang G. ShinCCS 2016 · 238 citations
- Evading Voltage-Based Intrusion Detection on Automotive CANRohit Bhatia, Vireshwar Kumar, Khaled Serag, Z. Berkay Celik et al.NDSS 2021
- CANARY - a reactive defense mechanism for Controller Area Networks based on Active RelaYsBogdan Groza, Lucian Popa, Pal-Stefan Murvay, Yuval Elovici et al.USENIX Security 2021 · 19 citations
- Models on the Move: Towards Feasible Embedded AI for Intrusion Detection on Vehicular CAN BusHe Xu, Di Wu, Yufeng Lu, Jiwu Lu et al.USENIX ATC 2024 · 4 citations
