EncELC: Hardening and Enriching Ethereum Light Clients with Trusted Enclaves
Chengjun Cai, Lei Xu, Anxin Zhou, Ruochen Wang, Cong Wang, Qian Wang
Abstract
The rapid growth of Ethereum blockchain has brought extremely heavy overhead for coin owners or developers to bootstrap and access transactions on Ethereum. To address this, light client is enabled, which only stores a small fraction of blockchain data and relies on bootstrapped full nodes for transaction retrievals. However, because the retrieval requests are outsourced, it raises several severe concerns about the integrity of returned results and the leakage of sensitive blockchain access histories, largely hindering the wider adoption of this important lightweight design. In addition to security issues, the continuously increasing blockchain storage also urges for more effective query functionalities for the Ethereum blockchain, so as to enable more flexible and precise transaction retrievals.In this paper, we propose EncELC, a new Ethereum light client design that enforces full-fledged protections for clients and enables rich queries over the Ethereum blockchain. EncELC leverages trusted hardware (e.g., Intel SGX) as a starting point for building efficient yet secure processing, and further crafts several crucial performance and security refinement designs to boost query efficiency and conceal leakages inside and outside SGX enclave. We implement a prototype of EncELC and test its performance in several real settings, and the results have confirmed the practicality of EncELC.
Ask about this paper
Ask your agent about it.
Lune has read the top-tier papers around this one, so every answer names the papers it rests on.
Your agent calls
Lunesearch_papers
Free to start. No credit card required.
Terminal
Install the CLIlune papers get 9597e5af-0531-4da2-8971-b33bdcf4161eCited by top-tier papers1
Ask how each one uses itRelated papers
- BITE: Bitcoin Lightweight Client Privacy using Trusted ExecutionSinisa Matetic, Karl Wüst, Moritz Schneider, Kari Kostiainen et al.USENIX Security 2019 · 109 citations
- REM: Resource-Efficient Mining for BlockchainsFan Zhang, Ittay Eyal, Robert Escriva, Ari Juels et al.USENIX Security 2017 · 124 citations
- LightBox: Full-stack Protected Stateful Middlebox at Lightning SpeedHuayi Duan, Cong Wang, Xingliang Yuan, Yajin Zhou et al.CCS 2019 · 88 citations
- EnclaveDB: A Secure Database Using SGXChristian Priebe, Kapil Vaswani, Manuel CostaS&P 2018 · 329 citations
- A Hardware-Software Co-design for Efficient Intra-Enclave IsolationJinyu Gu, Bojun Zhu, Mingyu Li, Wentai Li et al.USENIX Security 2022
