Blue Note: How Intentional Acoustic Interference Damages Availability and Integrity in Hard Disk Drives and Operating Systems
Connor Bolton, Sara Rampazzi, Chaohao Li, Andrew Kwong, Wenyuan Xu, Kevin Fu
Abstract
Intentional acoustic interference causes unusual errors in the mechanics of magnetic hard disk drives in desktop and laptop computers, leading to damage to integrity and availability in both hardware and software such as file system corruption and operating system reboots. An adversary without any special purpose equipment can co-opt built-in speakers or nearby emitters to cause persistent errors. Our work traces the deeper causality of these risks from the physics of materials to the I/O request stack in operating systems for audible and ultrasonic sound. Our experiments show that audible sound causes the head stack assembly to vibrate outside of operational bounds; ultrasonic sound causes false positives in the shock sensor, which is designed to prevent a head crash. The problem poses a challenge for legacy magnetic disks that remain stubbornly common in safety critical applications such as medical devices and other highly utilized systems difficult to sunset. Thus, we created and modeled a new feedback controller that could be deployed as a firmware update to attenuate the intentional acoustic interference. Our sensor fusion method prevents unnecessary head parking by detecting ultrasonic triggering of the shock sensor.
Ask about this paper
Your agent reads all of it.
Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.
Your agent calls
Luneget_paper_fulltext
Free to start. No credit card required.
Terminal
Install the CLIlune papers fulltext 915f8d7d-59a5-4eaa-abac-43914324215fCited by top-tier papers9
- SoK: A Minimalist Approach to Formalizing Analog Sensor SecurityChen Yan, Hocheol Shin, Connor Bolton, Wenyuan Xu et al.S&P 2020 · 86 citations
- Hard Drive of Hearing: Disks that Eavesdrop with a Synthesized MicrophoneAndrew Kwong, Wenyuan Xu, Kevin FuS&P 2019 · 63 citations
- Oligo-Snoop: A Non-Invasive Side Channel Attack Against DNA Synthesis MachinesSina Faezi, Sujit Rokka Chhetri, Arnav Vaibhav Malawade, John Charles Chaput et al.NDSS 2019 · 28 citations
- A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Spreading Deadly Pathogens Under the Disguise of Popular MusicAnomadarshi Barua, Yonatan Gizachew Achamyeleh, Mohammad Abdullah Al FaruqueCCS 2022 · 6 citations
- AquaSonic: Acoustic Manipulation of Underwater Data Center Operations and Resource ManagementJennifer Sheldon, Weidong Zhu, Adnan Abdullah, Sri Hrushikesh Varma Bhupathiraju et al.S&P 2024 · 5 citations
Builds on2
- My Smartphone Knows What You Print: Exploring Smartphone-based Side-channel Attacks Against 3D PrintersChen Song, Feng Lin, Zhongjie Ba, Kui Ren et al.CCS 2016 · 122 citations
- Hard Drive of Hearing: Disks that Eavesdrop with a Synthesized MicrophoneAndrew Kwong, Wenyuan Xu, Kevin FuS&P 2019 · 63 citations
Related papers
- MagBackdoor: Beware of Your Loudspeaker as A Backdoor For Magnetic Injection AttacksTiantian Liu, Feng Lin, Zhangsen Wang, Chao Wang et al.S&P 2023
- See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Feel No Evil, Print No Evil? Malicious Fill Patterns Detection in Additive ManufacturingChristian Bayens, Tuan Le, Luis Garcia, Raheem A. Beyah et al.USENIX Security 2017 · 53 citations
- UltrasonicWhisper+: Ultrasonic Attacks Generate Phantom Sounds in Your HearableHiroki Watanabe, Tsutomu TeradaUbiComp 2026 · 1 citation
- Speechless: Analyzing the Threat to Speech Privacy from Smartphone Motion SensorsS. Abhishek Anand, Nitesh SaxenaS&P 2018 · 110 citations
- Poltergeist: Acoustic Adversarial Machine Learning against Cameras and Computer VisionXiaoyu Ji, Yushi Cheng, Yuepeng Zhang, Kai Wang et al.S&P 2021 · 99 citations
