IRON: Functional Encryption using Intel SGX
Ben Fisch, Dhinakaran Vinayagamurthy, Dan Boneh, Sergey Gorbunov
Abstract
Functional encryption (FE) is an extremely powerful cryptographic mechanism that lets an authorized entity compute on encrypted data, and learn the results in the clear. However, all current cryptographic instantiations for general FE are too impractical to be implemented. We construct Iron, a provably secure, and practical FE system using Intel's recent Software Guard Extensions (SGX). We show that Iron can be applied to complex functionalities, and even for simple functions, outperforms the best known cryptographic schemes. We argue security by modeling FE in the context of hardware elements, and prove that Iron satisfies the security model. CCS CONCEPTS • Security and privacy → Public key (asymmetric) techniques; Hardware-based security protocols;
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