Round-Optimal Byzantine Agreement

Byzantine agreement is a fundamental primitive in cryptography and distributed computing, and minimizing its round complexity is of paramount importance. It is long known that any randomized r-round protocol must fail with probability at least (c • r) -r , for some constant c, when the number of corruptions is linear in the number of parties, t = θ(n). On the other hand, current protocols fail with probability at least 2 -r . Whether we can match the lower bound agreement probability remains unknown. In this work, we resolve this long-standing open question. We present a protocol that matches the lower bound up to constant factors. Our results hold under a (strongly rushing) adaptive adversary that can corrupt up to t = (1ϵ)n/2 parties, and our protocols use a public-key infrastructure and a trusted setup for unique threshold signatures. This is the first protocol that decreases the failure probability (overall) by a super-constant factor per round.