Exposing the Roots of DNS Abuse: A Data-Driven Analysis of Key Factors Behind Phishing Domain Registrations
Yevheniya Nosyk, Maciej Korczynski, Carlos Gañán, Sourena Maroofi, Jan Bayer, Zul Odgerel, Samaneh Tajalizadehkhoob, Andrzej Duda
Abstract
Cybercriminals have long depended on domain names for phishing, spam, malware distribution, and botnet operation. To facilitate the malicious activities, they continually register new domain names for exploitation. Previous work revealed an abnormally high concentration of malicious registrations in a handful of registrars and TLDs. However, no existing study systematically analyzed the factors driving abuse, leaving a critical gap in understanding how different variables influence malicious registrations. In this paper, we carefully distill the inclinations and aversions of malicious actors during the registration of new phishing domain names. Having compiled a list of 14.5 k malicious and 15.4 k benign domains, we collect a comprehensive set of 73 features for all the domains encompassing three main latent factors: registration attributes, proactive verification, and reactive security practices. With a GLM regression analysis, we found that each dollar reduction in registration fees corresponds to a 49% increase in malicious domain registrations. The availability of free bundled services, such as web hosting, drives an 88% surge in phishing activities. Conversely, stringent registration restrictions cut down abuse by 63%, while registrars providing API access for domain registration or account creation experience a staggering 401% rise in malicious domains. The results enable intermediaries involved in domain registration to develop tailored anti-abuse practices, yet aligning them with their economic interests.
Ask about this paper
Your agent reads all of it.
Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.
Your agent calls
Luneget_paper_fulltext
Free to start. No credit card required.
Terminal
Install the CLIlune papers fulltext 88cff934-68a9-431d-bda0-be3cee58a4efBuilds on6
- Tracking Ransomware End-to-endDanny Yuxing Huang, Maxwell Matthaios Aliapoulios, Vector Guo Li, Luca Invernizzi et al.S&P 2018 · 208 citations
- PREDATOR: Proactive Recognition and Elimination of Domain Abuse at Time-Of-RegistrationShuang Hao, Alex Kantchelian, Brad Miller, Vern Paxson et al.CCS 2016 · 133 citations
- Herding Vulnerable Cats: A Statistical Approach to Disentangle Joint Responsibility for Web Security in Shared HostingSamaneh Tajalizadehkhoob, Tom van Goethem, Maciej Korczynski, Arman Noroozian et al.CCS 2017 · 48 citations
- Compromised or Attacker-Owned: A Large Scale Classification and Study of Hosting Domains of Malicious URLsRavindu De Silva, Mohamed Nabeel, Charith Elvitigala, Issa Khalil et al.USENIX Security 2021 · 45 citations
- A Practical Approach for Taking Down Avalanche Botnets Under Real-World ConstraintsVictor Le Pochat, Tim Van hamme, Sourena Maroofi, Tom van Goethem et al.NDSS 2020
Related papers
- Characterizing and Mitigating Phishing Attacks at ccTLD ScaleGiovane C. M. Moura, Thomas Daniels, Maarten Bosteels, Sebastian Castro et al.CCS 2024 · 7 citations
- Don't Let One Rotten Apple Spoil the Whole Barrel: Towards Automated Detection of Shadowed DomainsDaiping Liu, Zhou Li, Kun Du, Haining Wang et al.CCS 2017 · 60 citations
- Hiding in Plain Sight: A Longitudinal Study of Combosquatting AbusePanagiotis Kintis, Najmeh Miramirkhani, Charles Lever, Yizheng Chen et al.CCS 2017 · 166 citations
- The Guardians of Name Street: Studying the Defensive Registration Practices of the Fortune 500Boladji Vinny Adjibi, Athanasios Avgetidis, Manos Antonakakis, Michael D. Bailey et al.NDSS 2025
- Game of Registrars: An Empirical Analysis of Post-Expiration Domain Name TakeoversTobias Lauinger, Abdelberi Chaabane, Ahmet Salih Buyukkayhan, Kaan Onarlioglu et al.USENIX Security 2017 · 39 citations
