TACHYON: Fast Signatures from Compact Knapsack
Rouzbeh Behnia, Muslum Ozgur Ozmen, Attila A. Yavuz, Mike Rosulek
Abstract
We introduce a simple, yet efficient digital signature scheme which offers post-quantum security promise. Our scheme, named TACHYON, is based on a novel approach for extending one-time hash-based signatures to (polynomially bounded) many-time signatures, using the additively homomorphic properties of generalized compact knapsack functions. Our design permits TACHYON to achieve several key properties. First, its signing and verification algorithms are the fastest among its current counterparts with a higher level of security. This allows TACHYON to achieve the lowest end-to-end delay among its counterparts, while also making it suitable for resource-limited signers. Second, its private keys can be as small as κ bits, where κ is the desired security level. Third, unlike most of its lattice-based counterparts, TACHYON does not require any Gaussian sampling during signing, and therefore, is free from side-channel attacks targeting this process. We also explore various speed and storage trade-offs for TACHYON, thanks to its highly tunable parameters. Some of these trade-offs can speed up TACHYON signing in exchange for larger keys, thereby permitting TACHYON to further improve its end-to-end delay.
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Builds on4
- Post-quantum Key Exchange - A New HopeErdem Alkim, Léo Ducas, Thomas Pöppelmann, Peter SchwabeUSENIX Security 2016 · 972 citations
- Post-Quantum Zero-Knowledge and Signatures from Symmetric-Key PrimitivesMelissa Chase, David Derler, Steven Goldfeder, Claudio Orlandi et al.CCS 2017 · 316 citations
- Side-Channel Attacks on BLISS Lattice-Based Signatures: Exploiting Branch Tracing against strongSwan and Electromagnetic Emanations in MicrocontrollersThomas Espitau, Pierre-Alain Fouque, Benoît Gérard, Mehdi TibouchiCCS 2017 · 145 citations
- To BLISS-B or not to be: Attacking strongSwan's Implementation of Post-Quantum SignaturesPeter Pessl, Leon Groot Bruinderink, Yuval YaromCCS 2017 · 88 citations
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