Empirical Analysis of EIP-1559: Transaction Fees, Waiting Times, and Consensus Security
Yulin Liu, Yuxuan Lu, Kartik Nayak, Fan Zhang, Luyao Zhang, Yinhong Zhao
Abstract
A transaction fee mechanism (TFM) is an essential component of a blockchain protocol. However, a systematic evaluation of the real-world impact of TFMs is still absent. Using rich data from the Ethereum blockchain, the mempool, and exchanges, we study the effect of EIP-1559, one of the earliest-deployed TFMs that depart from the traditional first-price auction paradigm. We conduct a rigorous and comprehensive empirical study to examine its causal effect on blockchain transaction fee dynamics, transaction waiting times, and consensus security. Our results show that EIP-1559 improves the user experience by mitigating intrablock differences in the gas price paid and reducing users' waiting times. However, EIP-1559 has only a small effect on gas fee levels and consensus security. In addition, we find that when Ether's price is more volatile, the waiting time is significantly higher. We also verify that a larger block size increases the presence of siblings. These findings suggest new directions for improving TFMs.
Ask about this paper
Your agent reads all of it.
Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.
Your agent calls
Luneget_paper_fulltext
Free to start. No credit card required.
Terminal
Install the CLIlune papers fulltext 8044b2d3-51d0-4eda-9fbb-be54157b6ca4Cited by top-tier papers7
- Did the Roll-Out of Community Notes Reduce Engagement With Misinformation on X/Twitter?Yuwei Chuai, Haoye Tian, Nicolas Pröllochs, Gabriele LenziniCSCW 2024 · 62 citations
- Blockchain CensorshipAnton Wahrstätter, Jens Ernstberger, Aviv Yaish, Liyi Zhou et al.WWW 2024 · 60 citations
- "Centralized or Decentralized?": Concerns and Value Judgments of Stakeholders in the Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs) MarketYunpeng Xiao, Bufan Deng, Siqi Chen, Kyrie Zhixuan Zhou et al.CSCW 2024 · 22 citations
- Justitia: An Incentive Mechanism Towards the Fairness of Cross-Shard TransactionsJian Zheng, Huawei Huang, Yinqiu Liu, Taotao Li et al.INFOCOM 2025 · 10 citations
- BunnyFinder: Finding Incentive Flaws for Ethereum ConsensusRujia Li, Mingfei Zhang, Xueqian Lu, Wenbo Xu et al.NDSS 2026 · 5 citations
Builds on7
- On the Security and Performance of Proof of Work BlockchainsArthur Gervais, Ghassan O. Karame, Karl Wüst, Vasileios Glykantzis et al.CCS 2016 · 1,668 citations
- On the Instability of Bitcoin Without the Block RewardMiles Carlsten, Harry A. Kalodner, S. Matthew Weinberg, Arvind NarayananCCS 2016 · 387 citations
- Quantifying Blockchain Extractable Value: How dark is the forest?Kaihua Qin, Liyi Zhou, Arthur GervaisS&P 2022 · 336 citations
- Foundations of Transaction Fee Mechanism DesignHao Chung, Elaine ShiSODA 2023 · 53 citations
- Impact and User Perception of Sandwich Attacks in the DeFi EcosystemYe Wang, Patrick Zuest, Yaxing Yao, Zhicong Lu et al.CHI 2022 · 52 citations
Related papers
- Auspex: Unveiling Inconsistency Bugs of Transaction Fee Mechanism in BlockchainZheyuan He, Zihao Li, Jiahao Luo, Feng Luo et al.USENIX Security 2025
- Deterring A Small Collusion is All You NeedYotam GafniWWW 2026
- Perils of Parallelism: Transaction Fee Mechanisms under Execution UncertaintySarisht Wadhwa, Aviv Yaish, Fan Zhang, Kartik NayakUSENIX Security 2026 · 3 citations
- Boosting Gas Revenues of Ethereum MinersTogzhan Barakbayeva, Soroush Farokhnia, Amir K. Goharshady, Sergei NovozhilovICSE 2026
- Precise static modeling of Ethereum "memory"Sifis Lagouvardos, Neville Grech, Ilias Tsatiris, Yannis SmaragdakisOOPSLA 2020 · 23 citations
