ICML2026

Envy-Free Allocation of Indivisible Goods via Noisy Queries

Zihan Li, Yan Hao Ling, Jonathan Scarlett, Warut Suksompong

Abstract

We introduce a problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods (items) in which the agents' valuations cannot be observed directly, but instead can only be accessed via noisy queries. In the two-agent setting with Gaussian noise and bounded valuations, we derive upper and lower bounds on the required number of queries for finding an envy-free allocation in terms of the number of items, mm, and the negative-envy of the optimal allocation, Δ\Delta. In particular, when Δ\Delta is not too small (namely, Δm1/4\Delta \gg m^{1/4}), we establish that the optimal number of queries scales as m(Δ/m)2=m2.5Δ2\frac{\sqrt m }{(\Delta / m)^2} = \frac{m^{2.5}}{\Delta^2} up to logarithmic factors. Our upper bound is based on non-adaptive queries and a simple thresholding-based allocation algorithm that runs in polynomial time, while our lower bound holds even under adaptive queries and arbitrary computation time.