Lune

PLDI2023Top-tier venue

VMSL: A Separation Logic for Mechanised Robust Safety of Virtual Machines Communicating above FF-A

Zongyuan Liu, Sergei Stepanenko, Jean Pichon-Pharabod, Amin Timany, Aslan Askarov, Lars Birkedal

Abstract

Thin hypervisors make it possible to isolate key security components like keychains, fingerprint readers, and digital wallets from the easily-compromised operating system. To work together, virtual machines running on top of the hypervisor can make hypercalls to the hypervisor to share pages between each other in a controlled way. However, the design of such hypercall ABIs remains a delicate balancing task between conflicting needs for expressivity, performance, and security. In particular, it raises the question of what makes the specification of a hypervisor, and of its hypercall ABIs, good enough for the virtual machines. In this paper, we validate the expressivity and security of the design of the hypercall ABIs of Arm's FF-A. We formalise a substantial fragment of FF-A as a machine with a simplified ISA in which hypercalls are steps of the machine. We then develop VMSL, a novel separation logic, which we prove sound with respect to the machine execution model, and use it to reason modularly about virtual machines which communicate through the hypercall ABIs, demonstrating the hypercall ABIs' expressivity. Moreover, we use the logic to prove robust safety of communicating virtual machines, that is, the guarantee that even if some of the virtual machines are compromised and execute unknown code, they cannot break the safety properties of other virtual machines running known code. This demonstrates the intended security guarantees of the hypercall ABIs. All the results in the paper have been formalised in Coq using the Iris framework.

Ask Lune

Know this paper in minutes, not an afternoon.

Lune can read every page of it and the top-tier papers that cite it, and gives you its claims, its evidence and its limits, each one cited to the paper it comes from. No skimming, no AI slop.

4 top-tier papers have cited it since. Know what they found before your reviewers do.

Questions to start from

Lune can draw on

the full paper · the top-tier papers that cite it · related work

Get the answer

Free to start. No credit card required.

Lineage

  • Islaris: verification of machine code against authoritative ISA semantics cites Integration verification across software and hardware for a simple embedded system
  • Islaris: verification of machine code against authoritative ISA semantics cites A Secure and Formally Verified Linux KVM Hypervisor
  • Efficient and provable local capability revocation using uninitialized capabilities cites Rigorous engineering for hardware security: Formal modelling and proof in the CHERI design and implementation process
  • An Axiomatic Basis for Computer Programming on the Relaxed Arm-A Architecture: The AxSL Logic cites Islaris: verification of machine code against authoritative ISA semantics
  • An Axiomatic Basis for Computer Programming on the Relaxed Arm-A Architecture: The AxSL Logic cites Integration verification across software and hardware for a simple embedded system
Builds onCited byLeft to right by year; the more cited, the higher.

Cited by top-tier papers4

  1. An Axiomatic Basis for Computer Programming on the Relaxed Arm-A Architecture: The AxSL LogicAngus Hammond, Zongyuan Liu, Thibaut Pérami, Peter Sewell et al.POPL 2024 · 8 citations
  2. Reasoning about External CallsSophia Drossopoulou, Julian Mackay, Susan Eisenbach, James NobleOOPSLA 2025
  3. Iris-WasmFX: Modular Reasoning for Wasm Stack SwitchingMaxime Legoupil, Mathias Pedersen, Lars Birkedal, Sam Lindley et al.PLDI 2026
  4. Lawyer: Modular Obligations-Based Liveness Reasoning in Higher-Order Impredicative Concurrent Separation LogicEgor Namakonov, Justus Fasse, Bart Jacobs, Lars Birkedal et al.OOPSLA 2026

Builds on7

  1. A Secure and Formally Verified Linux KVM HypervisorShih-Wei Li, Xupeng Li, Ronghui Gu, Jason Nieh et al.S&P 2021 · 72 citations
  2. Rigorous engineering for hardware security: Formal modelling and proof in the CHERI design and implementation processKyndylan Nienhuis, Alexandre Joannou, Thomas Bauereiss, Anthony C. J. Fox et al.S&P 2020 · 43 citations
  3. Efficient and provable local capability revocation using uninitialized capabilitiesAïna Linn Georges, Armaël Guéneau, Thomas Van Strydonck, Amin Timany et al.POPL 2021 · 30 citations
  4. Integration verification across software and hardware for a simple embedded systemAndres Erbsen, Samuel Gruetter, Joonwon Choi, Clark Wood et al.PLDI 2021 · 29 citations
  5. Islaris: verification of machine code against authoritative ISA semanticsMichael Sammler, Angus Hammond, Rodolphe Lepigre, Brian Campbell et al.PLDI 2022 · 28 citations

Related papers

  1. Iris-MSWasm: Elucidating and Mechanising the Security Invariants of Memory-Safe WebAssemblyMaxime Legoupil, June Rousseau, Aïna Linn Georges, Jean Pichon-Pharabod et al.OOPSLA 2024 · 5 citations
  2. Design and Verification of the Arm Confidential Compute ArchitectureXupeng Li, Xuheng Li, Christoffer Dall, Ronghui Gu et al.OSDI 2022 · 60 citations
  3. Le temps des cerises: efficient temporal stack safety on capability machines using directed capabilitiesAïna Linn Georges, Alix Trieu, Lars BirkedalOOPSLA 2022 · 17 citations
  4. Formal Verification of a Multiprocessor Hypervisor on Arm Relaxed Memory HardwareRunzhou Tao, Jianan Yao, Xupeng Li, Shih-Wei Li et al.SOSP 2021 · 24 citations
  5. Morello-Cerise: A Proof of Strong Encapsulation for the Arm Morello Capability Hardware ArchitectureAngus Hammond, Ricardo Almeida, Thomas Bauereiss, Brian Campbell et al.PLDI 2025 · 2 citations
Dusk over the sea between two cliffs drawn in fine vertical lines