USENIX Security2022Top-tier venue
SWAPP: A New Programmable Playground for Web Application Security
Phakpoom Chinprutthiwong, Jianwei Huang, Guofei Gu
Abstract
Client-side web attacks are one of the major battlefields for cybercriminals today. To mitigate such attacks, researchers have proposed numerous defenses that can be deployed on a server or client. Server-side defenses can be easily deployed and modified by web developers, but it lacks the context of client-side attacks such as DOM-XSS attacks. On the other hand, client-side defenses, especially in the form of modified browsers or browser extensions, require constant vendor support or user involvement to be up to date.
In this work, we explore the feasibility of using a new execution context, the service worker context, as a platform for web security defense development that is programmable, browser agnostic, and runs at the client side without user involvement. To this end, we propose and develop SWAPP (Service Worker APplication Platform), a framework for implementing security mechanisms inside a service worker. As the service worker is supported by most browsers, our framework is compatible with most clients. Furthermore, SWAPP is designed to enable the extensibility and programmability of the apps. We demonstrate the versatility of SWAPP by implementing various apps that can mitigate web attacks including a recent side-channel attack targeting websites that deploy a service worker. SWAPP allows websites to offload a part of the security tasks from the server to the client and also enables the possibility to deploy or retrofit emerging security features/prototypes before they are officially supported by browsers. Finally, we evaluate the performance overhead of our framework and show that deploying defenses on a service worker is a feasible option.
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