Influencer Backdoor Attack on Semantic Segmentation
Haoheng Lan, Jindong Gu, Philip Torr, Hengshuang Zhao
Abstract
When a small number of poisoned samples are injected into the training dataset of a deep neural network, the network can be induced to exhibit malicious behavior during inferences, which poses potential threats to real-world applications. While they have been intensively studied in classification, backdoor attacks on semantic segmentation have been largely overlooked. Unlike classification, semantic segmentation aims to classify every pixel within a given image. In this work, we explore backdoor attacks on segmentation models to misclassify all pixels of a victim class by injecting a specific trigger on non-victim pixels during inferences, which is dubbed Influencer Backdoor Attack (IBA). IBA is expected to maintain the classification accuracy of non-victim pixels and mislead classifications of all victim pixels in every single inference and could be easily applied to real-world scenes. Based on the context aggregation ability of segmentation models, we proposed a simple, yet effective, Nearest-Neighbor trigger injection strategy. We also introduce an innovative Pixel Random Labeling strategy which maintains optimal performance even when the trigger is placed far from the victim pixels. Our extensive experiments reveal that current segmentation models do suffer from backdoor attacks, demonstrate IBA real-world applicability, and show that our proposed techniques can further increase attack performance.
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Install the CLIlune papers fulltext 6d7de7e7-79c2-46ba-9134-7b3ea9b2d94bCited by top-tier papers4
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