Suppressing BGP Zombies with Route Status Transparency
Yosef Edery Anahory, Jie Kong, Nicholas Scaglione, Justin Furuness, Hemi Leibowitz, Amir Herzberg, Bing Wang, Yossi Gilad
Abstract
Withdrawal suppression has been a known weakness of BGP for over a decade. It has a significant detrimental impact on both the reliability and security of inter-domain routing on the Internet. This paper presents Route Status Transparency (RoST), the first design that efficiently and securely thwarts withdrawal suppression misconfigurations and attacks. RoST allows ASes to efficiently verify whether a route has been withdrawn; it is compatible with BGP as well as with BGP security enhancements. We use simulations on the Internet's AS-level topology to evaluate the benefits from adopting RoST. We use an extensive real-world BGP announcements dataset to show that it is efficient in terms of storage, bandwidth, and computational requirements.
Ask about this paper
Your agent reads all of it.
Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.
Your agent calls
Luneget_paper_fulltext
Free to start. No credit card required.
Terminal
Install the CLIlune papers fulltext 69c1e0a8-096f-4e34-b1ef-bc675e9b3233Cited by top-tier papers2
- ASRogue: Manipulating ASRank-Inferred AS RelationshipsYi Xu, Yihao Chen, Ke Xu, Qi Li et al.USENIX Security 2026
- EZ-SAVE: Evaluation of Easy-to-Deploy Source Address Validation PoliciesNicholas Scaglione, Justin Furuness, Yossi Gilad, Hemi Leibowitz et al.NSDI 2026
Builds on2
- Keep Your Friends Close, but Your Routeservers Closer: Insights into RPKI Validation in the InternetTomas Hlavacek, Haya Schulmann, Niklas Vogel, Michael WaidnerUSENIX Security 2023
- BGP-iSec: Improved Security of Internet Routing Against Post-ROV AttacksCameron Morris, Amir Herzberg, Bing Wang, Samuel SecondoNDSS 2024
Related papers
- Securing BGP ASAP: ASPA and other Post-ROV DefensesJustin Furuness, Cameron Morris, Reynaldo Morillo, Arvind Kasiliya et al.NDSS 2025
- A System to Detect Forged-Origin BGP HijacksThomas Holterbach, Thomas Alfroy, Amreesh Phokeer, Alberto Dainotti et al.NSDI 2024 · 21 citations
- Understanding Route Origin Validation (ROV) Deployment in the Real World and Why MANRS Action 1 Is Not FollowedLancheng Qin, Li Chen, Dan Li, Honglin Ye et al.NDSS 2024
- Pruning the Tree: Rethinking RPKI Architecture from the Ground upHaya Schulmann, Niklas VogelNDSS 2026 · 1 citation
- IRRedicator: Pruning IRR with RPKI-Valid BGP InsightsMinhyeok Kang, Weitong Li, Roland van Rijswijk-Deij, Ted Taekyoung Kwon et al.NDSS 2024
