LibreCAN: Automated CAN Message Translator
Mert D. Pesé, Troy Stacer, C. Andrés Campos, Eric Newberry, Dongyao Chen, Kang G. Shin
Abstract
Modern Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) are equipped with an increasing number of Electronic Control Units (ECUs), many of which produce large amounts of data. Data is exchanged between ECUs via an in-vehicle network, with the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus being the de facto standard in contemporary vehicles. Furthermore, CAVs have not only physical interfaces but also increased data connectivity to the Internet via their Telematic Control Units (TCUs), enabling remote access via mobile devices. It is also possible to tap into, and read/write data from/to the CAN bus, as data transmitted on the CAN bus is not encrypted. This naturally generates concerns about automotive cybersecurity. One commonality among most vehicular security attacks reported to date is that they ultimately require write access to the CAN bus. In order to cause targeted and intentional changes in vehicle behavior, malicious CAN injection attacks require knowledge of the CAN message format. However, since this format is proprietary to OEMs and can differ even among different models of a single make of vehicle, one must manually reverse-engineer the CAN message format of each vehicle they target --- a time-consuming and tedious process that does not scale. To mitigate this difficulty, we develop LibreCAN, which can translate most CAN messages with minimal effort. Our extensive evaluation on multiple vehicles demonstrates LibreCAN's efficiency in terms of accuracy, coverage, required manual effort and scalability to any vehicle.
Ask about this paper
Your agent reads all of it.
Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.
Your agent calls
Luneget_paper_fulltext
Free to start. No credit card required.
Terminal
Install the CLIlune papers fulltext 68d41e9d-2e15-4042-898f-3044ab5bd274Cited by top-tier papers3
- Towards Automatically Reverse Engineering Vehicle Diagnostic ProtocolsLe Yu, Yangyang Liu, Pengfei Jing, Xiapu Luo et al.USENIX Security 2022
- Evading Voltage-Based Intrusion Detection on Automotive CANRohit Bhatia, Vireshwar Kumar, Khaled Serag, Z. Berkay Celik et al.NDSS 2021
- EdgeTDC: On the Security of Time Difference of Arrival Measurements in CAN Bus SystemsMarc Roeschlin, Giovanni Camurati, Pascal Brunner, Mridula Singh et al.NDSS 2023
Builds on1
Related papers
- On Bit-level Reverse Engineering of Vehicular CAN BusYunlang Cai, Hanxue Shi, Xiaohang Wang, Haoting Shen et al.DAC 2025 · 2 citations
- CANvas: Fast and Inexpensive Automotive Network MappingSekar Kulandaivel, Tushar Goyal, Arnav Kumar Agrawal, Vyas SekarUSENIX Security 2019 · 49 citations
- Vulnerability of Controller Area Network to Schedule-Based AttacksSena Hounsinou, Mark Stidd, Uchenna Ezeobi, Habeeb Olufowobi et al.RTSS 2021 · 16 citations
- Error Handling of In-vehicle Networks Makes Them VulnerableKyong-Tak Cho, Kang G. ShinCCS 2016 · 238 citations
- ZBCAN: A Zero-Byte CAN Defense SystemKhaled Serag, Rohit Bhatia, Akram Faqih, Muslum Ozgur Ozmen et al.USENIX Security 2023
