One Email, Many Faces: A Deep Dive into Identity Confusion in Email Aliases
Mengying Wu, Geng Hong, Jiatao Chen, Baojun Liu, Mingxuan Liu, Min Yang
Abstract
—Email addresses serve as a universal identifier for online account management, however, their aliasing mechanisms introduce significant identity confusion between email providers and external platforms. This paper presents the first systematic analysis of the inconsistencies arising from email aliasing, where providers view alias addresses ( e.g., ALICE@example.com , al-ice+work@example.com ) as additional entrances of the base email ( alice@example.com ), while platforms often treat them as distinct identities. Through empirical evaluations the alias mechanisms of 28 email providers and 18 online platforms, we reveal critical gaps: (1) Only Gmail fully documents its aliasing rules, while 11 providers silently support undocumented alias behaviors; (2) Due to lack of standardization documentation and de facto implementation, platforms either failed to distinguish alias addresses or over aggressive excluded all emails containing specific symbol. Real-world abuse cases demonstrate attackers exploiting aliases to create up to 139 accounts from a single base email in npm for spam campaigns. Our user study further highlights security risks, showing 31.65% of participants with alias knowledge mistake phishing emails as legitimate emails alias due to inconsistent provider implementations. Users who believe they understand email aliasing, especially those highly educated, male, and technical participants, are more susceptible to being phished. Our findings underscore the urgent need for standardization and transparency in email aliasing. We contribute the OriginMail tool to help platforms resolve alias confusion and disclose vulnerabilities to affected stakeholders.
Ask about this paper
Your agent reads all of it.
Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.
Your agent calls
Luneget_paper_fulltext
Free to start. No credit card required.
Terminal
Install the CLIlune papers fulltext 6280c143-92a7-4f63-b622-952aa3fe129bBuilds on10
- Tranco: A Research-Oriented Top Sites Ranking Hardened Against ManipulationVictor Le Pochat, Tom van Goethem, Samaneh Tajalizadehkhoob, Maciej Korczynski et al.NDSS 2019 · 826 citations
- Detecting and Characterizing Lateral Phishing at ScaleGrant Ho, Asaf Cidon, Lior Gavish, Marco Schweighauser et al.USENIX Security 2019 · 113 citations
- Detecting Credential Spearphishing in Enterprise SettingsGrant Ho, Aashish Sharma, Mobin Javed, Vern Paxson et al.USENIX Security 2017 · 94 citations
- End-to-End Measurements of Email Spoofing AttacksHang Hu, Gang WangUSENIX Security 2018 · 94 citations
- Weak Links in Authentication Chains: A Large-scale Analysis of Email Sender Spoofing AttacksKaiwen Shen, Chuhan Wang, Minglei Guo, Xiaofeng Zheng et al.USENIX Security 2021 · 49 citations
Related papers
- An Investigation of Identity-Account Inconsistency in Single Sign-OnGuannan Liu, Xing Gao, Haining WangWWW 2021 · 9 citations
- FakeBehalf: Imperceptible Email Spoofing Attacks against the Delegation Mechanism in Email SystemsJinrui Ma, Lutong Chen, Kaiping Xue, Bo Luo et al.USENIX Security 2024 · 7 citations
- Composition Kills: A Case Study of Email Sender AuthenticationJianjun Chen, Vern Paxson, Jian JiangUSENIX Security 2020
- Unfiltered: Measuring Cloud-based Email Filtering BypassesSumanth Rao, Enze Liu, Grant Ho, Geoffrey M. Voelker et al.WWW 2024 · 1 citation
- Email Spoofing with SMTP Smuggling: How the Shared Email Infrastructures Magnify this VulnerabilityChuhan Wang, Chenkai Wang, Songyi Yang, Sophia Liu et al.USENIX Security 2025
