Exploring Privacy Leakage and Data Disclosure Violations in the MacOS Application Ecosystem
Jyotirmay Chauhan, Kostas Solomos, Mir Masood Ali, Jason Polakis
Abstract
The systematic and excessive data collection practices of tech companies have rendered online privacy both a necessity and a soughtafter commodity. However, while the privacy risks of the web, mobile, and IoT ecosystems have been extensively examined, desktop environments have been largely overlooked. As desktop apps continue to be widely used, they remain a critical yet understudied dimension of user privacy. In this paper, we address this gap by presenting the first, to our knowledge, comprehensive study of the mechanisms designed to regulate and disclose data collection and sharing practices in the macOS ecosystem. We adopt an app-development-centric view, and shed light on the interactions between the various macOS mechanisms that mediate apps' data access. Driven by our findings, we develop NutriScan, an analysis framework that incorporates both static and dynamic analysis techniques to create a consolidated view of macOS apps' data practices and disclosures. We use our system to dynamically analyze 1K macOS apps, and find that 85% of them access user-data APIs without disclosing it. 49.7% also exfiltrate data to advertising entities and hosting providers, 12.5% of which do so without a corresponding disclosure. We find that desktop apps are being leveraged by online trackers to enrich user profiles and device fingerprints, thus shedding new light on the true scope of the online tracking ecosystem. Our analysis reveals how the macOS app ecosystem is comprised of disjoint mechanisms with divergent data abstractions, thus increasing complexity for developers while also facilitating undisclosed privacy-invasive practices. Accordingly, we propose a series of mitigations that aim to both streamline the data disclosure process for developers and improve Apple's app vetting process.
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