At-Compromise Security - The Case for Alert Blindness
Martin R. Albrecht, Simone Colombo, Benjamin Dowling, Rikke Bjerg Jensen
Abstract
We start from the observation in prior work that cryptography broadly intuits security goals – as modelled in games or ideal functionalities – while claiming realism. This stands in contrast to cryptography’s attentive approach towards examining assumptions and constructions through cryptanalysis and reductions. To close this gap, we introduce a technique for determining security goals. Given that games and ideal functionalities model specific social relations between various honest and adversarial parties, our methodology is ethnography: a careful social science methodology for studying social relations in their contexts. As a first application of this technique, i.e. ethnography in cryptography, we study security at-compromise (neither pre- nor post-) and introduce the security goal of alert blindness. Specifically, in our 2024/2025 six-and-a-half-month ethnographic fieldwork with protesters in Kenya, we observed that alert blindness captures a security goal of abducted persons who were taken by Kenyan security forces for their presumed activism. We show this notion is achievable under standard assumptions by providing a construction secure in our model. We discussed both the notion and the construction with some interlocutors in Kenya.
Ask about this paper
Ask your agent about it.
Lune has read the top-tier papers around this one, so every answer names the papers it rests on.
Your agent calls
Lunesearch_papers
Free to start. No credit card required.
Terminal
Install the CLIlune papers get 5c22f99b-fa57-44a8-8ff0-9d0b7b0c9545Cited by top-tier papers2
- Information Security in Small-Scale Protests: Surveillance of Ugandan Anti-EACOP ProtestersNtezi Mbabazi, Rikke Bjerg JensenUSENIX Security 2026
- Analyzing Cryptography in Context: A Cryptography-Native Approach to Threat ModelingRan Canetti, Julie Ha, Gabriel KaptchukUSENIX Security 2026
Related papers
- On the Virtues of Information Security in the UK Climate MovementMikaela Brough, Rikke Bjerg Jensen, Martin R. AlbrechtUSENIX Security 2025
- Pseudo-Equilibria, Or: How to Stop Worrying About Crypto and Just Analyze the GameAlexandros Psomas, Athina Terzoglou, Yu Wei, Vassilis ZikasCRYPTO 2026
- Quantifying the Security Cost of Migrating Protocols to PracticeChristopher Patton, Thomas ShrimptonCRYPTO 2020 · 2 citations
- A Qualitative Study on Ethics Perspectives in Cryptography ResearchMaria Hellenthal, Thorsten Helfer, Doreen Riepel, Annabelle Walle et al.CCS 2026
- Cryptographic Deniability: A Multi-perspective Study of User Perceptions and ExpectationsTarun Kumar Yadav, Devashish Gosain, Kent E. SeamonsUSENIX Security 2023
