RowPress: Amplifying Read Disturbance in Modern DRAM Chips
Haocong Luo, Ataberk Olgun, Abdullah Giray Yaglikçi, Yahya Can Tugrul, Steve Rhyner, Meryem Banu Cavlak, Joël Lindegger, Mohammad Sadrosadati, Onur Mutlu
Abstract
Memory isolation is critical for system reliability, security, and safety. Unfortunately, read disturbance can break memory isolation in modern DRAM chips. For example, RowHammer is a well-studied read-disturb phenomenon where repeatedly opening and closing (i.e., hammering) a DRAM row many times causes bitflips in physically nearby rows.
This paper experimentally demonstrates and analyzes another widespread read-disturb phenomenon, RowPress, in real DDR4 DRAM chips. RowPress breaks memory isolation by keeping a DRAM row open for a long period of time, which disturbs physically nearby rows enough to cause bitflips. We show that RowPress amplifies DRAM's vulnerability to read-disturb attacks by significantly reducing the number of row activations needed to induce a bitflip by one to two orders of magnitude under realistic conditions. In extreme cases, RowPress induces bitflips in a DRAM row when an adjacent row is activated only once. Our detailed characterization of 164 real DDR4 DRAM chips shows that RowPress 1) affects chips from all three major DRAM manufacturers, 2) gets worse as DRAM technology scales down to smaller node sizes, and 3) affects a different set of DRAM cells from RowHammer and behaves differently from RowHammer as temperature and access pattern changes. We also show that cells vulnerable to RowPress are very different from cells vulnerable to retention failures.
We demonstrate in a real DDR4-based system with RowHammer protection that 1) a user-level program induces bitflips by leveraging RowPress while conventional RowHammer cannot do so, and 2) a memory controller that adaptively keeps the DRAM row open for a longer period of time based on access pattern can facilitate RowPress-based attacks. To prevent bitflips due to RowPress, we describe and analyze four potential mitigation techniques, including a new methodology that adapts existing RowHammer mitigation techniques to also mitigate RowPress with low additional performance overhead. We evaluate this methodology and demonstrate that it is effective on a variety of workloads. We open source all our code and data to facilitate future research on RowPress. 1 The industry is aware that keeping a DRAM row open for a long period of time can cause read disturbance: Micron mentions "RAS Clobber" in two earlier patents [50,158], while Samsung calls this "Passing Gate Effect" in a very recent work placed on arXiv while our paper has been under review [46]. We name this phenomenon "RowPress", which we believe is an intuitive name that immediately shows the difference compared to RowHammer in a figurative way: we "press" (i.e., keep open for a long period of time) instead of "hammer" (i.e., repeatedly open and close) the row. 2 The box is lower-bounded by the first quartile (i.e., the median of the first half of the ordered set of data points) and upper-bounded by the third quartile (i.e., the median of the second half of the ordered set of data points). The interquartile range (𝐼𝑄𝑅) is the distance between the first and third quartiles (i.e., box size). Whiskers show the minimum and maximum values. 3 Manufacturer-recommended minimum row open time (𝑡 𝑅𝐴𝑆 ) ranges from 32 ns to 35 ns in DDR4 [56]. We use a 36 ns minimum t AggON 1) to cover the whole range of 1
Ask about this paper
Your agent reads all of it.
Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.
Your agent calls
Luneget_paper_fulltext
Free to start. No credit card required.
Terminal
Install the CLIlune papers fulltext 50a9bc13-943e-4204-ae50-e136227deb74Cited by top-tier papers37
- Functionally-Complete Boolean Logic in Real DRAM Chips: Experimental Characterization and AnalysisIsmail Emir Yüksel, Yahya Can Tugrul, Ataberk Olgun, F. Nisa Bostanci et al.HPCA 2024 · 32 citations
- ABACuS: All-Bank Activation Counters for Scalable and Low Overhead RowHammer MitigationAtaberk Olgun, Yahya Can Tugrul, Nisa Bostanci, Ismail Emir Yuksel et al.USENIX Security 2024 · 29 citations
- MINT: Securely Mitigating Rowhammer with a Minimalist in-DRAM TrackerMoinuddin Qureshi, Salman Qazi, Aamer JaleelMICRO 2024 · 28 citations
- CoMeT: Count-Min-Sketch-based Row Tracking to Mitigate RowHammer at Low CostF. Nisa Bostanci, Ismail Emir Yüksel, Ataberk Olgun, Konstantinos Kanellopoulos et al.HPCA 2024 · 27 citations
- Chronus: Understanding and Securing the Cutting-Edge Industry Solutions to DRAM Read DisturbanceOguzhan Canpolat, A. Giray Yaglikçi, Geraldo F. Oliveira, Ataberk Olgun et al.HPCA 2025 · 23 citations
Builds on35
- DRAMA: Exploiting DRAM Addressing for Cross-CPU AttacksPeter Pessl, Daniel Gruss, Clémentine Maurice, Michael Schwarz et al.USENIX Security 2016 · 500 citations
- Drammer: Deterministic Rowhammer Attacks on Mobile PlatformsVictor van der Veen, Yanick Fratantonio, Martina Lindorfer, Daniel Gruss et al.CCS 2016 · 381 citations
- Another Flip in the Wall of Rowhammer DefensesDaniel Gruss, Moritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz, Daniel Genkin et al.S&P 2018 · 288 citations
- TRRespass: Exploiting the Many Sides of Target Row RefreshPietro Frigo, Emanuele Vannacci, Hasan Hassan, Victor van der Veen et al.S&P 2020 · 274 citations
- One Bit Flips, One Cloud Flops: Cross-VM Row Hammer Attacks and Privilege EscalationYuan Xiao, Xiaokuan Zhang, Yinqian Zhang, Radu TeodorescuUSENIX Security 2016 · 272 citations
Related papers
- Spatial Variation-Aware Read Disturbance Defenses: Experimental Analysis of Real DRAM Chips and Implications on Future SolutionsAbdullah Giray Yaglikçi, Yahya Can Tugrul, Geraldo F. Oliveira, Ismail Emir Yüksel et al.HPCA 2024 · 22 citations
- Understanding RowHammer Under Reduced Refresh Latency: Experimental Analysis of Real DRAM Chips and Implications on Future SolutionsYahya Can Tugrul, A. Giray Yaglikçi, Ismail Emir Yüksel, Ataberk Olgun et al.HPCA 2025 · 10 citations
- Variable Read Disturbance: An Experimental Analysis of Temporal Variation in DRAM Read DisturbanceAtaberk Olgun, F. Nisa Bostanci, Ismail Emir Yüksel, Oguzhan Canpolat et al.HPCA 2025 · 15 citations
- ImPress: Securing DRAM Against Data-Disturbance Errors via Implicit Row-Press MitigationAnish Saxena, Aamer Jaleel, Moinuddin QureshiMICRO 2024 · 15 citations
- PuDHammer: Experimental Analysis of Read Disturbance Effects of Processing-using-DRAM in Real DRAM ChipsIsmail Emir Yuksel, Akash Sood, Ataberk Olgun, Oguzhan Canpolat et al.ISCA 2025 · 6 citations
