First Price Auction is 1 - 1 /e2 Efficient
Yaonan Jin, Pinyan Lu
2022Year
3Citations
10Top-tier citations
Abstract
We prove that the PoA of First Price Auctions is 1-1/0.8647, closing the gap between the best known bounds [0.7430, 0.8689].
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Install the CLIlune papers fulltext 4ddb747d-3a9b-4d2c-aec9-845913380ec6Cited by top-tier papers10
- Learning Utilities and Equilibria in Non-Truthful AuctionsHu Fu, Tao LinNeurIPS 2020 · 14 citations
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- Proximal Regret and Proximal Correlated Equilibria: A New Tractable Solution Concept for Online Learning and GamesYang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, Haipeng Luo, Chen-Yu Wei et al.STOC 2026 · 5 citations
- Complexity of Equilibria in First-Price Auctions under General Tie-Breaking RulesXi Chen, Binghui PengSTOC 2023 · 3 citations
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