Quantifying and Mitigating Cache Side Channel Leakage with Differential Set
Cong Ma, Dinghao Wu, Gang Tan, Mahmut Taylan Kandemir, Danfeng Zhang
Abstract
Cache side-channel attacks leverage secret-dependent footprints in CPU cache to steal confidential information, such as encryption keys. Due to the lack of a proper abstraction for reasoning about cache side channels, existing static program analysis tools that can quantify or mitigate cache side channels are built on very different kinds of abstractions. As a consequence, it is hard to bridge advances in quantification and mitigation research. Moreover, existing abstractions lead to imprecise results. In this paper, we present a novel abstraction, called differential set, for analyzing cache side channels at compile time. A distinguishing feature of differential sets is that it allows compositional and precise reasoning about cache side channels. Moreover, it is the first abstraction that carries sufficient information for both side channel quantification and mitigation. Based on this new abstraction, we develop a static analysis tool DSA that automatically quantifies and mitigates cache side channel leakage at the same time. Experimental evaluation on a set of commonly used benchmarks shows that DSA can produce more precise leakage bound as well as mitigated code with fewer memory footprints, when compared with state-of-the-art tools that only quantify or mitigate cache side channel leakage.
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- STACCO: Differentially Analyzing Side-Channel Traces for Detecting SSL/TLS Vulnerabilities in Secure Enclaves cites Verifying Constant-Time Implementations
- VeCT: Secure and Efficient Constant-Time Code Rewriting with Vector Extensions cites Verifying Constant-Time Implementations
- SCAD: Towards a Universal and Automated Network Side-Channel Vulnerability Detection cites CacheD: Identifying Cache-Based Timing Channels in Production Software
Cited by top-tier papers2
Builds on13
- Verifying Constant-Time ImplementationsJosé Bacelar Almeida, Manuel Barbosa, Gilles Barthe, François Dupressoir et al.USENIX Security 2016 · 274 citations
- CacheD: Identifying Cache-Based Timing Channels in Production SoftwareShuai Wang, Pei Wang, Xiao Liu, Danfeng Zhang et al.USENIX Security 2017 · 130 citations
- Tinted, Detached, and Lazy CNF-XOR Solving and Its Applications to Counting and SamplingMate Soos, Stephan Gocht, Kuldeep S. MeelCAV 2020 · 102 citations
- Constant-time foundations for the new spectre eraSunjay Cauligi, Craig Disselkoen, Klaus von Gleissenthall, Dean M. Tullsen et al.PLDI 2020 · 90 citations
- STACCO: Differentially Analyzing Side-Channel Traces for Detecting SSL/TLS Vulnerabilities in Secure EnclavesYuan Xiao, Mengyuan Li, Sanchuan Chen, Yinqian ZhangCCS 2017 · 77 citations
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