Don't Shoot the Messenger: Localization Prevention of Satellite Internet Users
David Koisser, Richard Mitev, Marco Chilese, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
Abstract
Satellite Internet plays an increasingly important role in geopolitical conflicts. This notion was affirmed in the Ukrainian conflict escalating at the beginning of 2022, with the large-scale deployment of the Starlink satellite Internet service which consequently demonstrated the strategic importance of a free flow of information. Aside from military use, many citizens publish sensitive information on social media platforms to influence the public narrative. However, the use of satellite communication has proven to be dangerous, as the signals can be monitored by other satellites and used to triangulate the source on the ground. Unfortunately, the targeted killings of journalists have shown this threat to be effective. While the increasing deployment of satellite Internet systems gives citizens an unprecedented mouthpiece in conflicts, protecting them against localization is an unaddressed problem.To address this threat, we present AnonSat, a novel scheme to protect satellite Internet users from triangulation. AnonSat works with cheap off-the-shelf devices, leveraging long-range wireless communication to span a local network among satellite base stations. This allows rerouting users’ communication to other satellite base stations, some distance away from each user, thus, preventing their localization. AnonSat is designed for easy deployment and usability, which we demonstrate with a prototype implementation. Our large-scale network simulations using real-world data sets show the effectiveness of AnonSat in various practical settings.
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Cited by top-tier papers3
- Orbital Trust and Privacy: SoK on PKI and Location Privacy Challenges in Space NetworksDavid Koisser, Richard Mitev, Nikita Yadav, Franziska Vollmer et al.USENIX Security 2024 · 9 citations
- Time-varying Bottleneck Links in LEO Satellite Networks: Identification, Exploits, and CountermeasuresYangtao Deng, Qian Wu, Zeqi Lai, Chenwei Gu et al.NDSS 2025
- LPG: Raise Your Location Privacy Game in Direct-to-Cell LEO Satellite NetworksQuan Shi, Liying Wang, Prosanta Gope, Qi Liang et al.USENIX Security 2026
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