HEAP LOCALIZATION: Cache Side-Channel Based Linux Kernel Heap Exploit Techniques
Yoochan Lee, Sihyun Roh, Hyuk Kwon, Byoungyoung Lee, Thorsten Holz
Abstract
As kernel mitigations that reduce exploit success rates continue to be deployed, exploitation techniques have become increasingly sophisticated to maintain high reliability under such constrained environments. These techniques, however, fundamentally rely on precise knowledge of the locations of kernel heap objects-information that is not available to unprivileged users and forces attackers to depend on coarse and speculative inferences about allocator behavior. As a result, existing exploit techniques inevitably exhibit structural failure cases when vulnerable or target objects occupy unexpected intra-page positions. To address this limitation, we present Heap localization, the first primitive that enables objectlevel heap layout inference in the Linux kernel. Heap LOCALIZATION recovers the precise intra-page offset of kernel heap objects by exploiting deterministic VIPT L1 cache behavior, enabling deterministic object placement without requiring memory disclosure. By providing exact object-location information, Heap Localization eliminates layout-induced failure cases and transforms several previously probabilistic heap exploitation techniques into deterministic ones. Our evaluation demonstrates that Heap Localization consistently localizes and reliably positions objects, achieving average success rates of 99.3 % in the idle state and 95.7 % under heavy load. We further demonstrate its practicality by applying Heap Localization to real-world kernel vulnerabilities, where it significantly increases exploit reliability.
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